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 The Right of Elderly Patients to Refuse
 Life-sustaining Treatment
 GEORGE J. ANNAS and
 LEONARD H. GLANTZ
 Boston University Schools of Medicine
 and Public Health
 T HERE ARE NAMES THAT WE KNOW NOT BECAUSE
 of what they did, but because of how they died: Karen Ann
 Quinlan, Joseph Saikewicz, Brother Fox, Earle Spring, Claire
 Conroy, and William Bartling, to mention some of the most prominent.
 We know their names because there was conflict about how they would
 die, what medical interventions should be used to prolong their lives,
 who should make this decision, and on what basis. We know their
 names because representatives of these individuals, families, friends,
 and physicians went to court for guidance and protection in making
 these decisions. They felt obliged to seek court intervention because
 there are no statutes that define the rights of individuals in their
 circumstances, and the courts have emerged as the primary public
 forum in which issues about medical intervention and the rights of
 patients have been debated for the past decade.
 This article deals primarily with appellate court decisions regarding
 the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for elderly
 patients. This judicial focus was chosen because the courts have created
 almost all of the relevant law in this area by adjudicating individual
 cases on the basis of common law and constitutional law principles.
 Because of the complex nature of the issues, legislatures and regulatory
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 agencies have remained relatively silent. Traditional methods, like
 guardianships and durable powers of attorney, have been used in some
 instances, but usually without changing their original, much broader
 compass. More recently, adult protection services and public guardianship
 services have developed, but with a much broader agenda. The only
 type of legislation directly aimed at the withholding and withdrawal
 of life-sustaining treatment is "living will" legislation. Although drawn
 very narrowly to date, the debate on such legislation has helped to
 inform the public about these issues. Accordingly, we provide brief
 descriptions of traditional statutory mechanisms to protect elderly
 patients, and a detailed analysis of "living will" legislation.
 Why Cases Come to Court
 In a society dedicated to fostering the ideal of equality and "equal
 protection under law," the courts serve to protect individuals from
 exploitation by others. In the area of withholding and withdrawing
 life-sustaining treatment, the courts generally have not been involved
 in retrospective punishment through criminal proceedings, but have
 increasingly become involved in prospective decisions about treatment.
 These cases center on enforcing individual rights and establishing
 corresponding duties. Such cases have been presented to the courts
 for two primary reasons: (1) participants who have already agreed on
 a course of action want a guarantee of legal immunity before actually
 withdrawing or withholding medical treatment (e.g., Earle Spring);'
 and (2) appointment of a legal guardian is sought with specific authority
 over a treatment decision because of a dispute between family and
 providers over what course of action to take (e.g., Karen Ann Quinlan).2
 The role of the courts in each type of case is the same: to protect
 the rights of the incompetent individual about whose care others are
 making decisions, and to enforce the rights of competent patients to
 make their own decisions. The courts do this in a variety of ways,
 including (1) making the process public; (2) appointing individuals
 to represent the patient in court and in the health care setting; (3)
 'In the Matter of Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
 2In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
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 using legal principles to decide cases; and (4) giving reasons for their
 decisions.
 Definitional Problems: "Life-sustaining Treatment"
 The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
 Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1983, 24) recognized
 that "phrases like 'right to die,' 'right to life,' 'death with dignity,'
 'quality of life,' and 'euthanasia' have been used in such conflicting
 ways that their meanings, if they ever were clear, have become hopelessly
 blurred." This problem has been endemic in discussions concerning
 the treatment of the elderly patient.
 The term "life-sustaining treatment," for example, is found in the
 title of this article and used throughout it. It is not a term we are
 particularly happy with because of its vagueness. Courts and legislatures
 have used terms like "life prolonging," "life saving," "terminally ill,"
 and similar terms. When examined closely, these terms are not useful.
 What is the difference between "prolonging life" and "saving life"?
 If a life is extended for five minutes or five hours, or five days or five
 years, has it been "prolonged" or "saved"? Is someone terminally ill
 because he will imminently die of an identified disease? If someone
 has a disease we know will lead to death in ten years, is he terminally
 ill? Should the rights of a person be dependent on whether we deem
 him "terminally ill" or whether we deem his treatment "life prolonging"
 as opposed to "life saving"? We have found all these terms useless
 in analyzing the rights of patients. We have chosen the term "life-
 sustaining" reluctantly, although it is somewhat more emotionally
 neutral than the alternate terms. In this article, "life-sustaining treatment"
 means any treatment that extends the length of a person's life, whether
 for a minute or for 50 years. It applies whether or not a person is
 "terminally ill" and whether or not the treatment is "life prolonging"
 or "life saving." Thus, while we are not particularly enamored of the
 term, we frankly could not think of a better one.
 "Withholding" and "withdrawing" are clumsy words as well, but
 have the advantage of being descriptively accurate. More conceptually
 correct, but probably less intuitively clear, is the simple phrase "treatment
 refusal," which conveys the notion that we are dealing with all forms
 of treatment, and a refusal on the part of or on behalf of the patient.
 We think it is especially important to note that we do not distinguish
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 between various forms of medical treatment on the basis of their
 utility, side effects, number of moving parts, novelty, expense, or on
 other grounds. Such distinctions tend to be made on inherently arbitrary
 grounds, and detract from focusing on the individual patient, and
 his rights and welfare.
 Likewise, we do not think it is useful to distinguish among categories
 of adults (18 years of age or over) on the basis of age. Thus, while
 this article is concerned with elderly patients, it should be emphasized
 at the outset that the elderly have neither more nor fewer rights than
 the rest of the adult members of society. It is for this reason that,
 although a number of cases we discuss do not involve elderly patients,
 all of the principles derived from them are directly applicable to the
 elderly. The primary factor that compromises one's rights to refuse
 treatment is not age, but incompetence, an issue dealt with later in
 this article. Definitional problems are also dealt with in more detail
 in a later section, where statutory approaches are discussed.
 The Right to Refuse Treatment
 The Right of a Competent Adult to Refuse Treatment
 General Rules. Individuals have a common-law right to be free
 from nonconsensual bodily invasions. An unconsented-to invasion is
 a battery. As early as 1905 an Illinois court held:
 Under a free government at least, the free citizen's first and greatest
 right which underlies all others-the right to the inviolability of
 his person, in other words, his right to himself-is the subject of
 universal acquiescence, and this right necessarily forbids a physician
 S. . to violate without permission the bodily integrity of the patient
 by a major or capital operation.3
 More recently, courts have found that for the patient's consent to be
 valid, the physician must provide the patient with enough material
 3Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161 (1905), affd 224 Ill. 30, 79 N.E. 562
 (1905).
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 information about the proposed procedure that the patient can give
 an "informed consent."4
 In essence, the requirement that a physician obtain a patient's
 informed consent prior to performing a treatment is designed to ensure
 that the patient has some basic information prior to being asked to
 make a "go" or "no go" decision regarding treatment. The physician
 has specialized knowledge that is essential to the making of a reasoned
 decision, and the patient is the party who is to apply some of that
 knowledge to his own situation. The California Supreme Court explained
 this dyadic relationship as follows:
 A medical doctor, being the expert, appreciates the risks inherent
 in the procedure he is prescribing, the risks of a decision not to
 undergo the treatment, and the probability to a successful outcome
 of the treatment. But once this information has been disclosed,
 that aspect of the doctor's expert function has been performed. The
 weighing of those risks against the individual fears and hopes of
 the patient is not an expert skill. Such evaluation and decision is a
 non-medical judgment reserved to the patient alone. A patient should be
 denied the opportunity to weigh the risks only where it is evident
 he cannot evaluate the data, as, for example, where there is an
 emergency or the patient is a child or incompetent [emphasis added].5
 Courts thus view the decision whether or not to undergo treatment
 not as a medical one, but rather as a personal decision by the individual
 who will be directly affected. It follows that if a person is empowered
 by law to decide to undergo medical treatment, he is also empowered
 to decline such treatment. If a person cannot decline treatment, the
 "right" to decide whether or not to undergo a treatment becomes a
 sham, equivalent to a "right to agree with your doctor."
 In addition to the common-law right to refuse treatment, some
 courts have recognized a fundamental constitutional right to refuse
 treatment. In the Quinlan case, for example, the New Jersey Su-
 preme Court decided that the right of privacy enunciated by the
 4 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Harnish v. Children's
 Hospital, 387 Mass. 152, 439 N.E.2d 240 (1982).
 SCobbs v. Grant, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P. 2d 1 (1972).
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 United States Supreme Court "is broad enough to encompass a patient's
 decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances."6
 That well-known case involved a young woman who was in a permanent
 coma and on a mechanical ventilator. The Massachusetts Supreme
 Judicial Court concurs in that holding. The case involved a 67-year-
 old severely retarded ward of the state who had cancer for which
 chemotherapy offered the only chance for a remission.7 Where the
 right to refuse treatment is seen as a fundamental constitutional right,
 a state's authority to abridge the right is very narrow, and must be
 based on demonstrating a "compelling state interest." Four potentially
 compelling state interests were mentioned by both the Quinlan and
 Saikewicz courts: (1) protecting human life; (2) preventing suicide;
 (3) protecting innocent third parties; and (4) protecting the integrity
 of the medical profession. In neither of these cases, however, were
 any of these state interests found sufficiently compelling to outweigh
 the right of the individual patient, as exercised by a proxy. The proxy
 could withhold chemotherapy (in the case of Joseph Saikewicz) or
 withdraw mechanical ventilation (in the case of Karen Ann Quinlan),
 both of which could prolong their lives (Annas 1979, 373-75).
 "Life-sustaining" Treatments.' Jehovah's Witness blood transfusion cases.
 The right to refuse treatment is not limited to those patients for
 whom such a refusal would be of little or no significance. A close
 reading of the case law makes it apparent that competent adults who
 seriously express a desire to refuse treatment are permitted to do so,
 even when such a refusal would result in death.
 The early cases in this area of the law almost invariably involve
 Jehovah's Witnesses who need blood transfusions in order to survive.
 When one analyzes the facts of the various cases, it becomes readily
 apparent that these are not forced treatment of competent patient
 cases. Perhaps the most famous and widely cited case is Application
 of the President and Directors of Georgetown College.8 In this case, a 25-
 year-old mother of a seven-month-old child was brought to the hospital
 6In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
 7Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
 8 Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F. 2d 1000
 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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 with a bleeding ulcer, having lost two-thirds of her blood. Both the
 patient and her husband were Jehovah's Witnesses, a religion that
 prohibits the injection of blood into the body. Exactly how this
 religious tenet is applied, however, is subject to interpretation. Thus,
 when the judge in this case spoke to the husband, the judge reported:
 "He advised me that on religious grounds he would not approve a
 blood transfusion for his wife. He said, however, that if the court
 ordered the transfusion, the responsibility was not his." The judge
 then went to the patient's room and found: "It is obvious that the
 woman was not in a mental condition to make a decision." The judge
 asked the patient if "she would oppose the blood transfusion if the
 court allowed it. She indicated, as best I could make out, that it
 would not then be her responsibility." The court was thus not dealing
 with a competent patient who opposed transfusions if ordered by a
 court, but rather with a patient who could not give her own consent
 to it. The court's decision cannot be construed as forcing blood on
 a patient who refuses it: the patient and her husband were relieved
 to place this responsibility on the court's shoulders.
 Although a petition for a rehearing en banc was denied for technical
 reasons, a number of judges expressed the opinion that the single
 judge who decided this case had no authority to do so, and that if
 he did have such authority, that his decision was wrong. Circuit Judge
 (later Chief Justice) Burger asked in his opinion: "If the patient has
 objections to that treatment based on religious conviction, or if he
 rejects the medical opinion, are the courts empowered to decide for
 him?" He later answers this question by stating: ". . . there are
 myriads of problems and troubles which judges are powerless to solve;
 and this is as it should be. Some matters of essentially private concern
 and others of enormous public concern are beyond the reach of judges."
 Another so-called "forced treatment" case involved a 39-year-old
 father of two who had lost 60 to 65 percent of his red blood cells
 and refused to consent to a transfusion.9 According to the court, the
 patient was competent and rational. When the judge entered the
 hospital room, the first thing the patient said-before the judge asked
 any questions-was that he would not agree to the transfusion, but
 would in no way resist if the court ordered it. He maintained if the
 9 United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (Conn. 1965).
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 court ordered the transfusion it would be the court's will and not
 his-the responsibility for the act would be "on the court's conscience."
 The judge explained that he had no power to order the transfusion
 and the patient would be free to resist the transfusion by putting his
 hand over the site where the needle would be inserted. Mr. George
 responded that he would in no way resist the transfusion once the
 judge signed the order.
 These cases can be compared to one in which a 34-year-old father
 of two who was seriously injured refused necessary blood transfusions. 1o
 Mr. Osbourne told the judge that if the court ordered him to be
 transfused, he would be deprived of "everlasting life." The patient
 said: "It is between me and Jehovah, not the courts. ... I'm willing
 to take my chances. My faith is that strong. I wish to live but with
 no blood transfusions. Now get that straight." No transfusion was
 ordered.
 These examples illustrate that it is essential to distinguish between
 cases in which people truly refuse treatment, and those in which
 people refuse to consent affirmatively to treatment, but are willing
 to voluntarily undergo or "assent" to treatment if ordered by a judge.
 Ordering treatment in the former case violates the individual's privacy
 rights, while in the latter case there is no such violation.
 Unfortunately, much of our modern jurisprudence regarding the
 refusal of medical treatment is based on a misinterpretation of these
 and other early Jehovah's Witness cases. They were often initially
 decided in an emergency situation in which adequate deliberation is
 necessarily precluded. They were unusual in the sense that the courts
 are dealing with patients who seem to have anomalously consented
 to very serious physical invasions, such as major surgery, but not to
 the much less serious intrusion of blood transfusions. The amount of
 invasion the court "orders" is, therefore, much less than the patient
 has already consented to. None of the patients affirmatively refused
 to have the transfusions, and many seem to have believed that their
 religion forbade consent to blood transfusions, but not transfusions
 ordered by the court. Finally, none of these early cases dealt with the
 constitutional right of privacy, which has played such an important
 role in the contemporary cases.
 o?In re Osbourne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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 Life-sustaining Treatments: Representative Modern Cases. While Jehovah's
 Witness cases continue to come to court, more typical modern cases
 involve elderly patients who wish to refuse more invasive procedures
 on nonreligious grounds. An example is In re Quackenbush."1 Mr.
 Quackenbush was a 72-year-old man who refused to have his gangrenous
 legs amputated. "His conversation did wander occasionally but to no
 greater extent than would be expected of a 72-year-old man in his
 circumstances." He had shunned medical treatment over the past 40
 years. He was neither terminally ill nor comatose. If he had the
 operations, he would live indefinitely, but not having the operations
 would lead to his death. The court in this case explicitly held that
 the state's interest in preservation of life is not sufficiently compelling
 to override Mr. Quackenbush's right of privacy to decide competently
 his own future "regardless of the absence of a dim prognosis." Other
 courts, like those in Massachusetts and California have reached the
 same conclusion using similar reasoning. 12
 Contemporary courts have indicated that for competent patients
 the finding of a "good prognosis" is insufficient to provide the state
 with the power forcibly to treat these individuals. Whether or not a
 prognosis is "good" is not a medical issue, and not an issue capable
 of being resolved by an objective test. Rather, a prognosis is good
 or bad based on a subjective evaluation of the facts of a situation.
 Thus, Mr. Quackenbush's life would have been extended if his legs
 had been amputated. While this may seem like a "good" prognosis
 to physicians or judges, it did not seem like a "good" prognosis to
 Mr. Quackenbush. It is seldom, if ever, proper for a state to force
 its view of what a "good" prognosis is on a competent patient. The
 right to refuse medical treatment is not conditioned on the state's
 finding, or not finding, that the proposed treatment is "good." Rather
 it is based on the right of each citizen to make important personal
 health care decisions without interference by the state, in the absence
 of a demonstrable "compelling state interest."
 SIn re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282 (1978).
 12 Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. 1978); Bartling v. Superior
 Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1984).
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 Protecting the Rights of Incompetent Patients to
 Refuse Treatment
 Substantive principles. Of course, individuals cannot actually be self-
 determining after they become incompetent and lose their capacity
 for self-determination. Nonetheless, the proposition that an incompetent
 patient should be afforded the "right of self-determination" he could
 exercise if competent, insofar as possible, has been upheld by every
 court examining the issue since Quinlan. For example, the Massachusetts
 Supreme Judicial Court has strongly declared that the right to refuse
 treatment must extend to incompetent as well as competent patients
 "because the value of human dignity extends to both. "'3 Courts could
 probably come to no other conclusion without seriously undermining
 the rights of the weakest members of society: the mentally incompetent
 who are unable to protect their own interests. It is critical to the
 protection of liberty for all of us that our basic rights continue to be
 respected after we are no longer able to protect them ourselves. As
 legal scholar Ronald Dworkin (1978) has argued:
 The bulk of the law-that part which defines and implements social,
 economic and foreign policy--cannot be neutral. It must state, in
 its greatest part, the majority's view of the common good. The
 institution of rights is therefore crucial, because it represents the
 majority's promise to the minorities that their dignity and equality
 will be respected. When the divisions among the groups are most
 violent, then this gesture, if law is to work, must be most sincere.
 . . . [Taking rights seriously] is the one feature that distinguishes
 law from ordered brutality.
 In this regard, the law protects the "dignity and equality" of
 incompetent patients by attempting to honor, in some measure, their
 right to self-determination. Since dignity and equality extend to all
 human beings, respect for the rights of self-determination cannot be
 limited by medical diagnosis (e.g., Alzheimer's disease) or medical
 prognosis (e.g., irreversibly comatose or vegetative), but should extend
 to all incompetent persons. The challenge is to devise a reasonable
 13Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
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 mechanism to discern what their wishes would be, if they could in
 fact exercise self-determination.
 Substituted judgment. Since, by definition, an incompetent patient
 is unable to exercise his or her own self-determination by making
 decisions regarding treatment, this right must be exercised on behalf
 of the incompetent person by someone else or it is forfeited. To
 avoid loss of this right, the surrogate should utilize the "substituted
 judgment" standard, i.e., the surrogate should make a good-faith
 effort to make the treatment decision in the manner in which the
 patient himself would have made it if competent, provided there is
 sufficient evidence on which to base such a determination. As previously
 noted, the patient's choice concerning treatment is the primary relevant
 variable when we are dealing with a competent patient. Therefore,
 in order to afford the incompetent the right to self-determination,
 we must focus on the patient's previously expressed desires concerning
 treatment as the most critical factor in affording the now incompetent
 patient the right of choice, using other factors like lifestyle, values,
 and religious beliefs where relevant. The primacy of the "substituted
 judgment" test was recognized by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
 Quinlan, even in the absence of a clear declaration on Karen Quinlan's
 part, by granting the power to the "guardian and family of Karen
 to render their best judgment . . . as to whether she would exercise
 [her right to refuse treatment] in these circumstances."'4
 Preference for the substituted judgment test has been legally ac-
 knowledged by other courts dealing with the issue, and endorsed for
 both legal and ethical reasons by the President's Commission for the
 Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
 Research (1983). In the Saikewicz case, for example, even though the
 patient had never made any decisions for himself, the court required
 a determination of the patient's own "actual interests and preferences"
 in ascertaining what decision the incompetent person himself would
 make if he could speak for himself:
 The decision in cases such as this should be that which would be
 made by the incompetent person, if that person were competent,
 but taking into account the present and future incompetency of
 141n re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), 41.
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 the individual as one of the factors which would necessarilY enter
 into the decision-making process of the competent person.
 The New York Court of Appeals, in the "Brother Fox" case, was
 able to avoid many troubling issues by focusing on the individual's
 right to make his own decision. Brother Fox, an 83-year-old member
 of the Society of Mary, who, following routine hernia surgery, was
 left in a permanent vegetative state on a mechanical ventilator, had
 previously expressed an oral desire not to be maintained by "extraordinary
 means" if he were ever in a situation like Karen Ann Quinlan. As
 the court noted, the issue of whether or not someone else can speak
 for the patient "is not presented in this case because here Brother Fox
 made the decision for himself before he became incompetent."'6 Since,
 unlike the more casual statements of Karen Quinlan, Brother Fox's
 prior statements of desires were "obviously solemn pronouncements,"
 the court ruled that they must be followed. As the New York court
 properly noted, prior declarations can provide "clear and convincing"
 evidence of a person's wishes, and in the absence of evidence to the
 contrary should be considered the best evidence of the declarant's
 actual preferences.
 The President's Commission has likewise argued that whenever
 possible "decisionmaking for incapacitated patients should be guided
 by the principle of substituted judgment." The commission argued
 that this was morally and legally necessary to respect the person's
 autonomy by permitting the person the ultimate authority to determine
 for himself the meaning of health and well-being. Since individuals
 frequently disagree on these concepts, the person with the greatest
 interest in how they are determined, i.e., the patient himself, should
 be afforded the right to have the final say when possible. While we
 strongly agree that the substituted-judgment test is the primary and
 preferred test, we should note that in the absence of some competent
 prior expression by the patient, it is subject to abuse. The case of
 Mary Hier provides an example.
 At the time her case was first heard in court, Mary Hier was a 92-
 " Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
 16 Matter ofJohn Storar, In the Matter of Philip Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363 (1981).
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 year-old woman who suffered from senile dementia, thought she was
 the Queen of England, and had been institutionalized for more than
 fifty years. Based primarily on the fact that she pulled out her gastrostomy
 tube (through which she received all her nourishment because she was
 unable to take food orally) a lower court judge determined that she
 would reject such artificial feeding if she were competent to decide. 17
 Ironically, it is only by attributing competent motives to this act of
 an incompetent, aged, mentally ill, nursing home patient that the
 courts could justify not replacing the gastrostomy tube. Indeed, the
 appeals court pictured her as a competent patient in agony:
 Mrs. Hier's repeated dislodgments of gastric tubes, her resistance
 to attempts to insert a nasogastric tube, and her opposition to
 surgery all may be seen as a plea for privacy and personal dignity
 by a 92-year-old person who is seriously ill and for whom life has
 little left to offer.
 As this example illustrates, with a patient who has never competently
 expressed a preference, "substituted judgment" can serve as a ration-
 alization to mistreat or terminate treatment on patients who are un-
 desirable or difficult in some way. Luckily for Mrs. Hier, her guardian
 ad litem, Robert LeDeux, succeeded in returning the case to court
 and getting the court to order the gastrostomy tube replaced based
 on new evidence. Mrs. Hier is alive as of this writing.
 Best interests. In cases in which it is not possible to ascertain
 reasonably or accurately the patient's choice or preference (and this
 should always be the primary test used to protect autonomy) two
 avenues are open to us: either we adopt a rule that certain types of
 treatment can never be discontinued; or we permit the discontinuance
 of treatment under certain clearly specified conditions. Courts have
 found the former rule too rigid and not protective of incompetent
 patients, since competent individuals can and do reject proposed treat-
 ments. The latter rule, however, requires careful articulation to prevent
 potential abuses. Under the parens patriae doctrine, the state requires
 that surrogates make decisions for incompetent individuals that serve
 the best interests of the incompetent. Cases in which the "best interests"
 17 In re Mary Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200 (1984).
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 test must be used include not only those in which previously competent
 adults have not expressed a preference regarding treatment decisions,
 but also all cases of individuals who have never been competent to express
 such a preference: young children and the severely mentally retarded.
 The dangers of treating elderly patients using an "always treat" rule
 are well illustrated by the New York case of John Storar.'8
 John Storar was a profoundly retarded 52-year-old resident of a
 state facility who had a mental age of about 18 months. His closest
 relative was his mother, a 77-year-old widow who lived near the
 facility and visited him almost daily. In July 1979 he was diagnosed
 as having cancer of the bladder, and his mother was appointed his
 legal guardian to consent to radiation therapy, which produced a
 remission. Internal bleeding began again in March 1980, and his
 bladder was cauterized in an unsuccessful attempt to stop the bleeding.
 In addition, the cancer metastasized to his lungs, and his condition
 was considered inoperable and terminal. Nonetheless, in May the
 physicians asked the mother for permission to administer blood trans-
 fusions. She reluctantly agreed, but in June asked that the transfusions,
 which were given every two weeks, be discontinued because of the
 distress they caused her son. Because the physicians believed Mr.
 Storar would eventually bleed to death without the transfusions, they
 sought a court order to do them, even though with the transfusions
 they agreed he had only three to six months to live because of the
 cancer. The trial court agreed with the mother on the basis that it
 thought she was in the best position to determine what her son would
 want. The New York Court of Appeals, unfortunately and we believe
 wrongly, reversed the decision and ordered the blood transfusions
 continued.
 The Storar court incorrectly determined that a medical treatment
 decision for a terminally ill, adult, mentally retarded person had to
 be made on the same basis as if the adult was a curable child who
 would live a normal life after a blood transfusion. Accordingly, the
 court held that it was always in the incompetent patient's best interest
 to continue to receive blood transfusions even when the transfusions
 merely painfully prolonged the dying process for him. This analysis
 '8 Matter ofJohn Storar, In the Matter of Philip Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363 (1981).
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 is manifestly incorrect since Storar was dying of cancer. The court's
 heart was surely in the right place, but its mind, unfortunately, did
 not follow. It very properly wanted to protect children and other
 incompetents from those who would deny them life-sustaining medical
 treatment for reasons other than the patient's best interests. But it
 failed to recognize that there may be times when such treatment only
 prolongs suffering and is, therefore, itself cruel; and it failed to suggest
 any test that parents, families, or trial courts can apply to decide if
 it is ever legally permissible to withhold life-sustaining treatment
 from this category of patients.
 The "best interests" test arguably promotes self-determination since,
 in the absence of any idiosyncracy or a previous declaration to the
 contrary, it can be fairly assumed that the patient himself would make
 a decision consistent with his own objective best interests. Specifically,
 the best interests test is an objective test based on a notion of what
 most reasonable individuals in society would be likely to do in the
 same or similar circumstances. For example, in Quinlan the court
 noted that a decision by Karen's parents to remove her from the
 respirator would be in her own best interests by using the following
 rationale: "This decision should be accepted by a society the over-
 whelming majority of whose members would, we think, in similar
 circumstances, exercise such a choice in the same way for themselves
 or for those closest to them."''19 Of course, one can equally argue that
 the core of the best interests test is aimed at protecting the patient's
 welfare, as objectively viewed by society as a whole.
 But there are conceptual problems. In Conroy, for example, the
 New Jersey Supreme Court attempted to articulate a hierarchy of "best
 interests" tests. Under the "limited objective test," life-sustaining
 treatment may be withdrawn if "there is some trustworthy evidence
 that the patient would have refused the treatment, and . . . it is clear
 that the burdens of the patient's continued life with the treatment
 outweigh the benefits of that life for him." Under the "pure objective
 test" (i.e., when there is no evidence about what the patient might
 want) "the net burdens of the patient's life with the treatment should
 clearly outweigh the benefits that the patient derives from life ...
 [and) the recurring, unavoidable and severe pain of the patient's life
 19In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
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 with the treatment should be such that the effect of administering
 life-sustaining treatment would be inhumane.'20
 As to the "limited test," if there is "some trustworthy evidence,"
 it should be followed if sufficient and ignored if insufficient. Seen in
 this light, it is simply another way of expressing the "substituted
 judgment" test. The "pure objective test," focusing exclusively on
 "recurring, unavoidable and severe pain" as the only basis for withholding
 or withdrawing treatment, is far too narrow. There may be other
 things like impossibility of recovery, and the use of restraints, in
 addition to pain, that objectively make continued treatment more
 burdensome than beneficial to the patient. Such a test tends to ignore
 the plight of the individual patient, by justifying actions that otherwise
 could not objectively be viewed as in their "best interests."
 Procedural Mechanisms. Once the substantive principles are agreed
 upon (i.e., that we want to follow the wishes of the patient if reasonably
 possible, and, if these cannot be ascertained, then we want to take
 that action which is in the patient's "best interests"), what remains
 is developing a procedure that ascertains the patient's wishes or best
 interests accurately, fairly, efficiently, and in a manner that is societally
 acceptable (Cramton 1982). Courts have become the primary forum
 in which both substantive and procedural guidelines are being debated
 and defined. The reason is not that courts are more intelligent than
 physicians, families, or other third parties. The reason is simply that
 judges (and not physicians, families, or others) have a social mandate
 to distill the values and morals of society on which most of these
 cases must ultimately be decided (Annas 1979, 384). In the words
 of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo (1921, 135-36):
 You may say that there is no assurance that judges will interpret
 the mores of their day more wisely and truly than other men. I
 am not disposed to deny this, but in my view it is quite beside
 the point. The point is rather that this power of interpretation
 must be lodged somewhere, and the custom of the Constitution
 has lodged it in the judges. If they are to fulfill their function as
 judges, it could hardly be lodged elsewhere. Their conclusions
 must, indeed, be subject to constant testing and retesting, revision
 and readjustment; but if they act with conscience and intelligence,
 20 In the Matter of Claire Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
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 they ought to attain in their conclusions a fair average of truth and
 wisdom.
 The mechanisms courts use to determine incompetency and patient
 preferences, appoint guardians, determine the authority of guardians,
 and grant legal immunity, are explored in the next section.
 The Role of Competence in Decisions to Refuse
 Life-sustaining Treatment
 American law properly presumes that every competent adult is at
 liberty to consent to or refuse any proposed medical treatment or
 intervention. A further appropriate legal presumption is that all adults
 are competent, and the burden of proof is on those who would declare
 them incompetent. Accordingly, competence has become a central
 issue in all discussions of the "right to refuse treatment" (Annas and
 Densberger 1984).
 Unfortunately, as individuals age, the reality is that health care
 providers, family members, and others are more likely to conclude
 that actions that would not indicate incompetence at a younger age,
 all of a sudden do in the elderly. This is not a new problem. Sophocles's
 sons brought a proceeding against him to obtain his property, and
 supported their argument that he was a lunatic on the basis of his
 preoccupation with writing his play, Oedipus at Colonus. In his defense,
 Sophocles read from the play and asked the jury if it seemed the work
 of an imbecile. The jury reportedly applauded the reading and declared
 Sophocles competent. One modern legal commentator opines that,
 under contemporary statutes, use of this defense could result in the
 sons walking out of the courtroom "in control of his property" (Atkinson
 1979). Indeed, many states retain "advanced age" as sufficient grounds
 for appointment of a conservator over one's property. It was only in
 1976 in California and 1978 in Illinois that an individual could not
 be found incompetent merely because he was "old and sick" (Atkinson
 1979).
 Society does not view all ages as having equal value, and generally
 holds the "demented aged in low esteem" (Cassel and Jameton 1981).
 Physicians are likely to mirror this societal prejudice. For example,
 Earle Spring was a 77-year-old man in a nursing home with irreversible
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 kidney disease and severe senile dementia. At a hearing to decide
 whether or not to discontinue his renal dialysis, his dialysis physician
 testified that in determining whether or not it is appropriate to
 continue dialysis treatment he considers "whether a person is a real
 person, whether the person is happy to be alive, whether other people
 around him or her are happy to have him alive [emphasis added)." 21 These
 loose and subjective quality-of-life standards are clearly inappropriate.
 Even though the evidence of Mr. Spring's actual wishes regarding
 continuation of kidney dialysis was virtually nonexistent, the Mas-
 sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court nonetheless affirmed a lower court
 decision that Mr. Spring would, "if competent, choose not to receive
 the life prolonging treatment." What really seemed to be at stake
 was the court's (and society's?) view that older people in Mr. Spring's
 condition, by virtue of their physical and mental limitations, do not
 have much to live for. The family testimony, for example, was to
 the effect that Mr. Spring had led a vigorous, active life, which he
 was no longer able to do. The fact, of course, is that it is almost
 always true that as people get older, their level of activity declines,
 and is often severely curtailed. It does not follow from this, however,
 that such a person would prefer to be dead.
 Because of such prejudice, the aged may be treated not as competent
 adults, but as incompetent children. The medical presumption may
 often be that the aged are presumed incompetent to refuse medical
 treatment until they can demonstrate to the physician's satisfaction
 that they are competent.
 In this context, a competence proceeding, and the subsequent ap-
 pointment of a guardian, can be used as a weapon against the elderly.
 The results can be devastating. Reduced to the status of a child in
 the eyes of the law, "most statutes deprive the ward of the right to
 buy or sell property, to contract, to sue and be sued, to make gifts,
 to write checks, and generally to engage in financial transactions of
 any kind . . . of the right to vote, to marry, to operate a motor
 vehicle, and to consent to or refuse medical treatment" (Hortsman
 1975; Regan 1981).
 Because of the centrality of a competence determination to individual
 self-determination and well-being, it is critical that those assessing
 21 In the Matter of Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980) (quotation taken from
 lower court transcript).
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 competence have a clear understanding of its legal meaning, and that
 the individual whose competence is being questioned be afforded due
 process of law. Due process, however, is meaningless if the concept
 of competence itself is not well understood and articulated. In this
 regard the courts have consistently utilized the notion of competence
 as a capacity to perform certain tasks and have been willing to find
 individuals competent to perform some tasks (e.g., to decide where
 to live) while incompetent to perform others (e.g., to give away one's
 home or all of one's belongings). In the medical context, it will be
 concluded that the most reasonable way to conceptualize competence
 will be to ascertain the individual's capacity to understand and appreciate
 the information needed to give an informed consent or an informed
 refusal to the treatment under consideration. Thus, capacity is pro-
 portioned to the seriousness of the decision, although what often seems
 to be at stake is the degree of certainty courts require concerning
 incapacity to perform a specific task. The less important the task in
 terms of its consequences to the individual, the more certainty we
 require to find someone incompetent to perform it.
 Definition of Competence
 Informed Consent and Competence
 The informed consent doctrine requires that a patient be given material
 information (information that might influence a patient's decision)
 about his condition, the proposed treatment (including its risks and
 benefits), and its alternatives (Annas, Glantz, and Katz 1977, 1981)
 Implemented in good faith by the physician, informed consent enhances
 both self-determination and rational decision making. It is assumed
 that an informed patient has sufficient information on which to base
 a decision to accept or reject proposed treatment. Thus, it is important
 to assess the patient's capacity to understand and appreciate the in-
 formation required to be disclosed so that we can be confident it is
 the patient's decision when he makes it.
 Infants and comatose patients provide clear examples of patients
 who are incapable of making decisions regarding medical care. There
 are equally obvious cases where the patient is capable of making such
 decisions. Unfortunately, there are also many borderline cases from
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 the perspective of the physician, who wants both to honor the patient's
 wishes (respect autonomy) and deliver good medical care (promote
 the patient's well-being), when these two objectives seem to conflict.
 There are, for example, cases in which the capacity of elderly patients
 to participate in the medical decision-making process appears questionable
 or where the physician believes that the patient's refusal is not reflective
 of his own values and preferences, but is instead a product of psychological
 or sociological factors. Such cases are dealt with in a variety of ways
 with varying degrees of arbitrariness, including sincere attempts to
 determine patient competence objectively.
 Approaches to Competence
 A variety of approaches have been suggested to determine competence.
 The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
 Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1982) identified
 three: outcome, status, and function. Under the outcome approach, actual
 decisions by patients which do not reflect community values are used
 as evidence of incompetence. Under the status approach, an individual's
 competence is based solely on his physical or mental status (i.e.,
 consciousness, age, mental or physical diagnosis). The functioning approach
 focuses on the individual's actual understanding and processes in decision-
 making situations.
 Most commentators have assumed that the functioning approach is
 the correct approach, and have tried to define better the attributes
 needed to function competently. One philosopher has suggested, for
 example, that we can require any one of four increasingly strict standards:
 (1) free action, which involves a voluntary and intentional choice;
 (2) authentic decision, which is a decision that reflects the individual's
 values; (3) effective deliberation, which is an evaluation of the specific
 alternatives and their consequences; and (4) moral reflection, which
 is, in addition to effective deliberation, reflection on and acceptance
 of the moral values upon which the decision is based (Miller 1981).
 Two psychiatrists used an analogous classification of increasingly difficult
 tests and suggested the following four possible tests: (1) evidencing
 a choice; (2) evidencing an understanding of relevant issues; (3) rationally
 manipulating the relevant information; and (4), in addition to (2) and
 (3), an appreciation of the nature of the situation. In their words,
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 "[4appreciation is distinct from factual understanding in that it requires
 the subject to consider the relevance to his immediate situation of
 those facts he has understood previously in the abstract" (Roth, Meisel,
 and Lidz 1977). The authors regard this as the "strictest" standard.
 It is also the most reasonable one and, if fairly applied, the one that
 is most appropriate in hospital and nursing home settings.
 A "functioning" approach, incorporating the appreciation requirement,
 avoids the pitfalls of second-guessing an individual's personality implicit
 in the authentic-decision and moral-reflection test. The functioning
 approach also helps ensure that the decision the patient makes is one
 he realizes will have consequences for himself that he understands and
 finds desirable or acceptable. In addition, the test has a solid legal
 pedigree in the context of treatment refusals.
 The functioning test, including the appreciation requirement, is
 the one most often used by the courts, and was the key factor in two
 major cases of refusal of life-saving amputations by elderly patients.
 The cases were decided by appeals courts in Massachusetts and Tennessee
 about the same time, 1978, and did not refer to each other. The
 Massachusetts case involved Mrs. Candura, a 77-year-old widow and
 a diabetic who was suffering from gangrene in her right foot and
 lower leg.22 She had undergone two previous amputations (a toe and
 a portion of her right foot) and at the time of the second amputation,
 an arterial bypass had been performed in an attempt to decrease the
 probability of recurrences of gangrene. Her attending physicians rec-
 ommended that the leg be amputated without delay. After some
 vacillation, she refused the operation and persisted in that refusal.
 The trial court held that Mrs. Candura was:
 incapable of making a rational and competent choice to undergo
 or reject the proposed surgery to her right leg. To this extent her
 behavior is irrational. She has closed her mind to the entire issue
 to the extent that the court cannot conclude that her decision to
 reject further treatment is rational and informed.
 The trial court concentrated on its finding that she had "closed her
 mind" and the court thus seemed to focus on "autonomy as effective
 22 Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. 1978).
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 deliberation." Ultimately, however, this appears to have been less
 important to the trial court than her actual decision which the court
 characterized as "irrational," thus falling into the "outcome approach"
 trap. The appeals court, on the other hand, concentrated on her ability
 to "appreciate" her situation and its alternatives. The appeals court
 reversed the trial court's decision and stated that "Mrs. Candura's
 decision may be regarded by most as unfortunate, but on the record
 in this case it is not the uninformed decision of a person incapable
 of appreciating the nature and consequences of her act [emphasis added]."
 The court noted that "[u]ntil she changed her original decision and
 withdrew her consent to the amputation, her competence was not
 questioned." The doctors readily accepted her consent to the two
 initial amputations, and only questioned it when she disagreed with
 their judgment about her treatment. The court made it clear that
 competence is not to be judged by a standard of medical rationality,
 that is, what her physicians consider the only reasonable decision.
 Rather, the relevant factors were her understanding of the proposed
 operation and the consequences of refusing it. According to the court,
 "[Mrs. Candura] has made it clear that she does not wish to have the
 operation even though that decision will in all likelihood lead shortly
 to her death."
 In an enlightening footnote, the court noted that one of the two
 psychiatrists who testified at the trial thought Mrs. Candura was
 competent. Asked why he differed from the other psychiatrist, he
 replied, "I think it is just a personal philosophy type of thing where
 I believe persons ought to be given the benefit of the doubt as to
 what they want to do with their lives, whereas, Dr. Kelley, I guess,
 is more protective." The point is not which psychiatrist was "correct,"
 but that they differed over the issue of the appropriate criteria for
 competence, based on their own "philosophical" views. It also points
 to the importance of physicians understanding and respecting the legal
 definition of competence. Because of the "philosophy" of a particular
 psychiatrist, Mrs. Candura was deprived of her right to make her
 own decisions by the trial court. Obviously this type of testimony
 will not be very useful to a court or other decision maker charged
 with determining an individual's competence on the basis of the
 standard legal test.
 The Tennessee case involving Mary Northern is similar, although
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 in that case the court found the 72-year-old woman incompetent to
 consent to or refuse amputation.23 As a result of frostbite, both of
 Mary Northern's feet were necrotic. They were coal black in color,
 "shriveled, rotting and stinking." According to the testimony, Ms.
 Northern was perfectly lucid and understood everything other than the
 condition of her feet. She believed her feet would heal without surgery,
 and refused to consider the possibility that she might die without
 the amputation. Because she would not explicitly acknowledge that
 she would rather die than have her feet amputated (she responded
 "possibly" when that question was put to her), the court determined
 that she was refusing to make a choice, and was "mentally incapable
 of comprehending the facts which constitute" the danger to her life.
 The court used the following definition to find her incompetent:
 Capacity means mental ability to make a rational decision, which
 includes the ability to perceive, appreciate all relevant facts and to
 reach a rational judgment upon such facts.
 The court did not adopt the "outcome test," i.e., it did not object
 to her refusal per se. Rather it was her capacity to make an informed
 decision that the court objected to: "On the subject of death and
 amputation of her feet, her comprehension is blocked, blinded or
 dimmed to the extent that she is incapable of recognizing facts which
 would be obvious to a person of normal perception [emphasis added]." The
 major fact Ms. Northern consistently was incapable of recognizing
 was that her feet were "dead, black, shriveled, rotting and stinking."
 As Judge Drowota wrote in a concurring opinion:
 If this Court could in good faith find that she perceived as facts
 that her feet do look and smell as they do, and that her doctors
 are telling her that she needs surgery to save her life, we would
 not interfere with whatever decision she made regardless of how
 much it conflicted with the substance of her medical advice or with
 what we ourselves might have chosen.
 The judicial test of competence is based then on an individual's
 capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of
 23 Department of Human Services v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. 1978).
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 one's decisions. It can be restated in the medical care context by
 saying that if an individual understands and appreciates the information
 needed to give an informed consent, then that individual is competent
 to give both an informed consent and to refuse consent, assuming,
 of course, that the decision is made freely and voluntarily. The type
 and quantity of information that must be understood and appreciated
 will vary with the actual treatment options, and the risks and alternatives
 that face the patient, but not with the status of the patient (status
 test) or the actual decision made by the patient (outcome test).
 Relation of Competence to Other Factors
 Use of the "outcome approach" by physicians, as in the Candura case,
 is probably the rule rather than the exception. Typically, competence
 is questioned only when a patient refuses to consent to a recommended
 treatment. Testimony before the President's Commission for the Study
 of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
 (1982, 61) is consistent with this view: "Coherent adults are seldom
 said to lack capacity (except, perhaps, in the mental health context)
 when they acquiesce in the course of treatment recommended by their
 physician."
 Without a specific, consistent basis for questioning and determining
 competence, the patient's refusal-an easily identifiable target for
 criticism because it conflicts with the physician's view of the patient's
 well-being-can easily become a justification for paternalism. This
 may result in the substitution of the physician's own judgment and
 values for those of the patient, including the physician's conception
 of a "good" or "bad" decision. The physician may also attempt to
 establish a cause-effect relation between some kind of mental or physical
 factor (e.g., depression or blood loss) and the undesirable decision,
 thus enabling him to invalidate that decision on "medical" grounds
 and to proceed with his own decision.
 A patient's age alone should never be a sufficient basis for a declaration
 of incompetence. But there are complicating factors. A patient may
 vacillate in a decision to accept or refuse treatment. This by itself
 does not constitute incompetence, but a patient who vacillates poses
 a problem to the physician attempting to discern what the patient
 wants. One sound approach is to incorporate a reasonable waiting
 period for nonemergency cases into the competence assessment, such
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 as the case of an elderly person with a nonemergency medical condition,
 so that the patient's actual desires can be ascertained.
 The difficulty in formulating policy for the vacillating patient lies
 in determining what constitutes a "reasonable period of time" to wait
 before making a judgment as to the patient's actual desires. If a
 question persists, treatment cannot be forced until a determination
 is made (either at the bedside or in court) that the patient is incompetent
 to make the decision regarding his care in the specific instance.
 Treatment can continue, however, if the patient gives simple assent.
 This is because it is a much lesser harm to liberty to continue treatment
 to which the patient has at least assented than to force treatment
 against a person's will.
 Another potential complicating factor is mental illness. The existence
 of mental illness does not always constitute incompetence, although
 it may. In one famous lower court decision, a 65-year-old schizophrenic
 woman refused surgery for breast cancer.24 At the trial, Ms. Yetter
 indicated that the operation would interfere with her genital system,
 affecting her ability to have babies, and would prohibit a movie career.
 Her caseworker testified, however, that based on conversations with
 her six months previously, at the time she refused surgery, she was
 informed and she was "conscious of the consequences" of her refusal.
 The judge concluded that although her refusal "may be irrational and
 foolish to an outside observer," and although it is now "accompanied
 by delusions," the delusions do not appear to be her primary reason
 for rejecting surgery. Accordingly, he upheld what he described as
 "her original understanding but irrational decision," on the basis that
 health care providers have an obligation to follow the competent and
 understanding wishes of their patients, even if their patients later
 become delusional or suffer other mental illnesses that bring their
 current competence into question.
 On the other hand, the Northern case, discussed above, provides an
 example where a specific delusion will be sufficient to determine
 incompetence where the delusion concerns facts material to an informed
 decision (in that case, the inability to appreciate that her feet were
 necrotic, and that she would probably die if they were not amputated).
 The limited amount of literature on treatment refusals has placed
 24 In re Yetter, Northampton Co. Orphans Ct., No. 1973-533 (Williams, J.)
 (Pa. 1973).
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 a heavy emphasis on the difficulties of dealing with a patient's "transient
 feelings of despair and hopelessness" and feelings of depression.
 Depression may often be a perfectly understandable and healthy response
 to catastrophic disease or injury. Moods affect the patient's decision-
 making capability, but do not necessarily render the patient completely
 incapable of making decisions regarding his or her care at all times.
 Moods such as depression and anger are fairly common among
 patients who may be heavily medicated and away from their homes,
 in strange environments, and separated from their loved ones. Such
 separation and isolation is, of course, the condition of almost all
 elderly patients in nursing homes. It is understandable that one might
 feel depressed under such circumstances. Elderly patients in isolated
 nursing home situations are also likely to be devalued by physicians,
 and even some courts.
 Seriously injured persons, such as those suffering spinal cord injuries
 or serious burns, may experience shock, grief, pain, depression, and
 adverse psychological effects from powerful drugs. Sometimes such
 feelings can be effectively treated with "supportive psychotherapy" or
 antidepressant drugs. If these treatments are indicated and not refused
 by the patient, it is certainly appropriate to pursue them. On the
 other hand, if the competent patient refuses such treatment and persists
 in a refusal of treatment, that refusal should be honored. The relevant
 question is whether a mood such as depression has become so severe
 as to undermine one's ability to understand and appreciate the nature
 and consequences of one's decisions. If it has not, it alone does not
 justify a determination of incompetence.
 Appointment of a Legal Guardian for an
 Incompetent Person
 Method of Appointment
 Legal guardians can only be appointed by courts, and the requirements
 for such appointment are set forth in state statutes. The state's power
 to grant authority over an individual to a guardian is part of its parens
 patriae authority (a term derived from the English common law concept
 of the King's role as father of the country). The notion is that the
 state will provide a "father" or guardian for incompetents, formally
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 limited to "idiots" and "lunatics." In common law in England, a
 jury of twelve determined the mental status of an individual. "If an
 incompetent were determined by the jury to be a lunatic, the Chancellor
 committed him to the care of some friend, who received an allowance
 with which to care for him" (Hortsman 1975). Modern statutes generally
 provide for a formal hearing before a judge, although the procedure
 can be expedited and completed in less than a few hours in an
 emergency medical situation in which a temporary guardian is appointed
 for the purpose of making a medical treatment decision.
 Almost all of the most well-known cases involving elderly patients
 in treatment refusal or withdrawal circumstances have involved the
 appointment of a legal guardian for the elderly person who has been
 judicially declared incompetent. This has been the case, for example,
 in the Northern and Candura (although reversed on appeal) cases, as
 well as the cases of Earle Spring (77 years old, withdrawal of kidney
 dialysis); Brother Fox (80-year-old comatose individual, withdrawal
 of ventilator); Claire Conroy (80-year-old severely demented individual,
 withdrawal of artificial nutrition); and Joseph Saikewicz (67 years old,
 refusal of chemotherapy for cancer). If incompetent persons must have
 guardians appointed for them to dispose of property, it certainly seems
 appropriate for guardians to be required for treatment decisions that
 pose serious risks to the individual or have life or death consequences.
 The first major guardianship case did not involve an elderly person,
 although the age of Karen Quinlan was not a factor in the court's
 decision. Karen's father sought appointment as Karen's guardian for
 the purpose of ordering her mechanical ventilator removed. The hospital
 and physicians had informed him that they would not remove the
 ventilator. The lower court judge refused to appoint Mr. Quinlan the
 guardian, or to grant any guardian the authority to remove the ventilator.
 The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed this, and awarded legal
 guardianship to Karen's father. It disagreed with the lower court that
 his closeness to Karen might cause him anguish and distort his "decision-
 making process." Instead the court held:
 While Mr. Quinlan feels a natural grief, and understandably sorrows
 because of the tragedy which has befallen his daughter, his strength
 of purpose and character far outweighs these sentiments and qualifies
 him eminently for guardianship of the person . .. of his daughter.25
 25 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
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 The court also noted that next of kin were statutorily preferred for
 guardianship, and there was "no valid reason" to negate this presumption
 in refusal of treatment cases.
 Authority of Legal Guardian in Treatment Refusals
 Guardians have the legal authority to refuse all types of medical in-
 terventions when such refusal is based on what the ward would want
 (substituted judgment) or on the best interests of the ward (when
 applying the substituted judgment test is not possible). On the other
 hand, in some jurisdictions, guardians may not have the authority to
 consent to certain types of treatment, like sterilization and use of
 psychotropic drugs where conflicts of interest may exist.
 For example, in Massachusetts it has been determined that a guardian
 cannot consent to the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs
 for either an outpatient26 or an inpatient.27 The courts based their
 rulings on the findings that antipsychotic medication has "devastating
 and often irreversible" side effects, that the treatment is extremely
 intrusive, and that guardians (such as parents) may be in a conflict
 of interest because they derive benefit from the control of the patient's
 behavior. Because of these findings, these courts concluded that only
 courts, not guardians, could authorize the forcible use of antipsychotic
 medications.
 Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled that only a
 court, not a guardian, could authorize the sterilization of an incom-
 petent.28 What these courts have done is to decide that certain procedures
 are either too risky, or so subject to abuse, or both, that courts must
 oversee their use. It is far from clear what the impact of such cases
 might have on the treatment-withholding or treatment-withdrawing
 cases. The Grady case is interesting because it was decided by the
 Quinlan court. In Quinlan, the court specifically held that judicial
 intervention in treatment-withdrawal cases was neither necessary nor
 desirable. It then decided Grady, a case that required court involvement
 to sterilize incompetent people. Following Grady, the New Jersey
 26 Guardianship of Richard Roe, 385 Mass. 415 (1981).
 27 Rogers v. Commissioner of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489 (1983).
 28 In the Matter of Lee Ann Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
This content downloaded from 
            128.197.229.194 on Tue, 14 Dec 2021 14:29:03 UTC             
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Rights of Elderly Patients 123
 court decided Conroy which, like Quinlan, did not require court au-
 thorization to withhold treatment (although it did require the inter-
 vention of an ombudsman and court-appointed guardian). It is apparent
 that courts are willing and able to carve out exceptions to the rule
 that guardians are empowered to consent to (and therefore refuse)
 medical treatment for their wards. They have not chosen to do so in
 the general treatment-withholding or treatment-withdrawing cases,
 but could do so in the future if abuses become apparent or conflicts
 of interest exist. In addition, there has been enough uncertainty
 concerning the guardian's authority to provoke considerable litigation.
 The Quinlan case is again the best example. After declaring Mr.
 Quinlan the guardian of his daughter, the court went on to spell out
 his authority regarding the termination of her mechanical ventilator
 with "full power to make decisions with regard to the identity of her
 treating physicians." Other courts have followed this general path:
 responding to a request for a judgment that both requests the ap-
 pointment of a guardian, and asks for specific, judicially sanctioned
 authority to terminate treatment. Alternatively, legal guardians, who
 have already been appointed for other reasons, have petitioned the
 court for specific authority to order the removal of life-sustaining
 treatment.
 For example, in the case of Mrs. Edna Marie Leach, a 70-year-old
 housewife with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, her husband first sought
 guardianship (after Mrs. Leach's physician refused to honor his request
 to remove her from the ventilator), and then separately sought a court
 order as guardian to have all life-support systems removed from his
 wife (and ward). The court granted the guardian's request, but only
 under certain conditions, and only after a hearing at which a separate
 guardian ad litem was appointed to argue on Mrs. Leach's behalf.29
 Likewise, in the case of Bertha Colyer, a 69-year-old heart attack
 victim who was resuscitated only to wind up in a persistent vegetative
 state, her husband and legal guardian sought a court order to have
 her removed from the ventilator. In that case the Supreme Court of
 Washington held specifically that while a court always had to be
 involved in appointing a legal guardian, the statutory authority of
 29 Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 426 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio Ct. Comm.
 Pleas, 1980).
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 such guardians in Washington "enables a guardian to use his best
 judgment and exercise, when appropriate, an incompetent's personal
 right to refuse life-sustaining treatment." The court made it clear
 that once the guardian was appointed "the courts need not be involved
 in the substantive decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment."30
 We believe it is fair to characterize the Colyer court's statement
 as "the law." Specifically, only a court can appoint a legal guardian.
 However, once a legal guardian is appointed, that guardian can make
 the decision to order withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment on the
 basis of substituted judgment, or, if the ward's wishes are unknown,
 on the basis of the ward's best interests. With the exceptions of
 psychotropic drugs and sterilization, no court has held otherwise, and
 all courts that have ruled on the substantive issue of whether treatment
 may be withdrawn in a particular instance have done so upon the
 request of a physician, family member, legal guardian, or some other
 third party.
 Whether or not the appointment of a "legal guardian" is always
 required to authorize the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
 treatment from an incompetent person is a difficult question. There
 are some circumstances where the benefits from continued treatment
 are either nonexistent or so extremely slight that some courts have
 indicated that appointment of a guardian is unnecessary if a close
 family member acts in the name of the patient. This makes good
 sense. The issue has, however, only been directly discussed in three
 cases, all of which involved patients like Karen Ann Quinlan who
 were in (or nearly in) persistent vegetative states, and thus had no
 reasonable possibility of regaining consciousness.
 The first case is that of Mrs. Shirly Dinnerstein, in which the court
 was asked if prior approval of a court was necessary to write an order
 not to resuscitate a 67-year-old woman suffering from end-stage Alz-
 heimer's disease and a variety of other disorders which left her confined
 to bed in an "essentially vegetative state. "31 The Massachusetts Appeals
 Court decided that where there was no real hope for the patient,
 treatment would be in her best interests only if there "was some
 reasonable expectation of effecting a permanent or temporary cure or
 3o Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash.2d 114, 660 2d 738 (1983).
 31 Matter of Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
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 relief from the illness or condition being treated ... at the very
 least, a remission of symptoms enabling a return towards a normal,
 functioning, integrated existence" [emphasis added). Accordingly, the
 court concluded that the question of the "do not resuscitate" (DNR)
 order was "a question peculiarly within the competence of the medical
 profession of what measures are appropriate to ease the imminent
 passing of an irreversibly, terminally ill patient in light of the patient's
 history and condition and wishes of her family. " In such a circumstance,
 i.e., where the critical question is the medical appropriateness of
 withholding specific treatment based on its potential to benefit the
 patient, neither guardian nor court approval was necessary.
 The other two cases involved patients in permanent comas. The
 second case was a Florida case involving a terminally ill elderly gentleman,
 Francis Landy, who had signed a "mercy will" prior to entering an
 "irreversible coma" and "essentially vegetative state.9"32 In addressing
 the specific question of whether, under these circumstances, the ap-
 pointment of a guardian was necessary to exercise Mr. Landy's wishes
 under his "mercy will," the court held:
 The right of a patient, who is in an irreversibly comatose and
 essentially vegetative state to refuse extraordinary life-sustaining
 measures, may be exercised either by his or her close family members
 or by a guardian of the person of the patient appointed by the
 court.
 While the court insisted that judicial appointment of a legal guardian
 was not required, it did require that "at least two other physicians"
 certify that "the patient is in a permanent vegetative state."
 In the third case, the Supreme Court of Washington was asked
 explicitly to reconsider its requirement of a court-appointed guardian
 in Colyer.33 The case involved a 42-year-old severely mentally retarded
 gentleman who, as a result of pneumonia and hypoxemia, suffered
 complete destruction of cerebral activity. He had no known relatives
 and was a ward of the state. Accordingly, appointment of a guardian
 was required. On the other hand, the court accepted the request that
 32John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
 33 Guardianship of Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372 (Wash. 1984).
This content downloaded from 
            128.197.229.194 on Tue, 14 Dec 2021 14:29:03 UTC             
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 126 George J. Annas and Leonard H. Glantz
 it reexamine its holding in Colyer, and modified it to conclude that
 in cases of persistent vegetative state diagnosis, "guardianship proceed-
 ings are [not] a necessary predicate to effective decision making." On
 the other hand, in the absence of a court-appointed guardian, unanimous
 agreement on the prognosis and treatment decision must be obtained
 from "the immediate family [andi the treating physicians . . . to
 protect against abuse and therefore eliminate the need for added
 judicial oversight through the guardianship procedure in this limited
 category of cases."34
 These cases, and the vast majority of similar ones that never find
 their way into court, demonstrate that there is still considerable
 confusion regarding the necessity of a guardian in treatment-withholding
 decisions. In the Earle Spring case, for example, the Massachusetts
 Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the history of guardianships in medical-
 treatment decisions, and noted that in the past they had required
 "consent or its equivalent" (sometimes using consent of a spouse as
 "equivalent") for treatment decisions, and only turned to guardianships
 when "consent or its equivalent" was not available. The court also
 noted in passing the tradition of treating an unconsented-to treatment
 as "battery" and opined that it might be more useful to view this
 area of the law in terms of negligence." We think the court is on
 the right track. For example, while it is a battery to treat someone
 without their consent, it is certainly not a battery to refrain from
 treating (or to withhold or withdraw treatment). It would seem more
 reasonable to look at the withholding and withdrawal area as negligence.
 The critical issue is thus not consent (although consent or its equivalent
 might be required under certain circumstances), but negligence: i.e.,
 is the treatment one that a reasonably prudent physician would not
 give under the circumstances? If so, it may be appropriate to withhold
 or withdraw such treatment without consent. For example, an in-
 competent patient could have a DNR order properly written without
 a guardian's consent, if CPR was not something a reasonably prudent
 physician would initiate under the circumstances. The next question
 is whether the guardian, if needed, must apply for specific authority
 to make medical treatment decisions.
 34Guardianship of Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372 (Wash. 1984).
 35 In the Matter of Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980).
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 The issue of requiring a legal guardian's decision to be approved
 in advance by a court was first raised in the Quinlan case (and declared
 unnecessary), and raised shortly thereafter in Massachusetts. The case
 involved a severely retarded 67-year-old man who was a ward of the
 state.36 He was diagnosed as having cancer, and chemotherapy was
 the recommended treatment. After a hearing, a probate judge decided
 that Mr. Saikewicz would be better off without the treatment, and
 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed this decision
 less than two months later. Two months later still, Mr. Saikewicz
 died. It was another 14 months after his death that the SJC released
 its now-famous opinion, which followed the Quinlan case in every
 major particular except one.
 The SJC rejected the Quinlan court's delegation of immunity-granting
 authority to an "ethics committee," even in narrowly circumscribed
 persistent vegetative state cases. It held that if physicians and others
 wanted a grant of immunity before withdrawing life-sustaining treat-
 ment, such a grant could only be obtained from a court. Some com-
 mentators and some courts read this case to mean that all decisions
 by guardians to withdraw life-sustaining treatment must be approved
 in advance by a court of law. In part because of this misinterpretation
 of their holding, and subsequent confusion about it, the SJC clarified
 its ruling in 1980 in the case of Earle Spring, the 77-year-old nursing
 home resident with senile dementia whose family wanted him taken
 off of kidney dialysis (his son had been appointed temporary guardian)
 because they believed that was what he would want. On the specific
 issue of whether it was always necessary for a guardian to seek prior
 court approval of such a decision, the SJC was clear:
 Our opinions should not be taken to establish any requirement of
 prior judicial approval that would not otherwise exist.37
 The most recent case on guardianship authority is the New Jersey
 case of Claire Conroy.38 This case is important not only because it is
 the most recent, but also because it is a carefully considered opinion
 36 Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
 37 In the Matter of Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
 38 In the Matter of Claire Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
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 by the same court that penned the Quinlan decision. Unfortunately,
 this case has served to make treatment-withdrawal decisions by guardians
 for elderly incompetent persons, at least those who are in nursing
 homes, far more difficult in New Jersey. Indeed, almost a year after
 the decision, no treatments have been terminated on elderly patients
 using the procedures defined in Conroy (Sullivan 1985).
 The case was brought by Ms. Conroy's only living relative, a nephew
 who had previously been appointed her legal guardian, who sought
 an order to have her nasogastric feeding tube removed after her attending
 physician refused this request. The New Jersey Supreme Court held
 that a legal guardian did have such authority without added court
 intervention, but only after a court had made a specific finding that
 the ward was incompetent to consent or withhold consent for the
 particular treatment in question. If such a determination has not been
 made, and "if the patient already has a general guardian, the court
 should determine whether that guardian is a suitable person to represent
 the patient with respect to the medical decision in question." This
 will involve a court examination of the guardian's knowledge, mo-
 tivations, and possible conflicts of interest.
 The court took special note of the New Jersey ombudsman statute,
 which was designed to help protect the rights of the institutionalized
 elderly in the state. Its decision, which it tried to limit to nursing
 home residents, requires the guardian to notify the office of the
 ombudsman whenever action to terminate treatment is "contemplated."
 The ombudsman is instructed to treat such a notification as a possible
 case of "abuse" and investigate it immediately. This investigation is
 to include the appointment of two physicians, in addition to the
 patient's attending physician, to examine the patient to confirm the
 medical condition and prognosis. If all involved, including the om-
 budsman, agree that withdrawal would be what the ward would want
 in this circumstance, then the ward's wishes should be carried out.
 If such a decision cannot be reached then either of two best-interests
 tests can be applied. Under the limited objective test, life-sustaining
 treatment may be withdrawn if "there is some trustworthy evidence
 that the patient would have refused the treatment, and . . . it is clear
 that the burdens of the patient's continued life with the treatment
 outweigh the benefits of that life for him." Under the pure objective
 test (i.e., when there is no evidence about what the patient might
 want), "the net burdens of the patient's life with the treatment should
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 clearly outweigh the benefits that the patient derives from life ...
 [and] the recurring, unavoidable and severe pain of the patient's life
 with the treatment should be such that the effect of administering
 life-sustaining treatment would be inhumane." This very strict test,
 which centers on severe pain, is adopted because the majority's belief
 that "when evidence of a person's wishes or physical or mental condition
 is equivocal, it is best to err, if at all, in favor of preserving life";
 and not to adopt this conservative posture "would create an intolerable
 risk for socially isolated and defenseless people suffering from physical
 or mental handicaps." When either of these tests is used, the patient's
 family, including spouse, parents, and children, "must concur in the
 decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment." If all of
 these steps are taken "in good faith," then all actors have legal
 immunity for their actions.
 There are a number of problems with this procedural approach.
 First, it seems wholly unnecessary where the patient has written an
 explicit living will and designated a proxy through a durable power
 of attorney to carry out his wishes. Second, as Justice Handler argues
 persuasively in dissent, the "pure objective test" that focuses exclusively
 on "recurring, unavoidable and severe pain" as the only basis for
 withholding or withdrawing treatment seems too narrow. There may
 be other negative considerations like probability of benefit, use of
 restraints, invasiveness, etc., in addition to pain, that objectively may
 make continued treatment more burdensome than beneficial to the
 patient. Third, to require the ombudsman always to assume the
 withdrawal or withholding of treatment is abusive until proven otherwise
 will likely discourage families and others from using this mechanism,
 even if doing so would fulfill the clear wishes of their nursing-home-
 bound relative. Fourth, although the court acknowledges that a major
 problem in nursing home care is finding a physician who will go
 there, it requires not one, but three physicians to examine the patient
 and report on the patient's condition. One outside consultant should
 suffice to confirm the medical condition and options. Finally, although
 many of the flaws in the Quinlan case have been clarified, the court
 persists in delegating its immunity-granting authority to third parties.
 In Quinlan, the delegation was to an "ethics committee" (which has
 properly been renamed a "prognosis committee"). In Conroy, the court
 delegates immunity-granting authority to a undesignated group that
 must concur, but need never meet: the guardian, attending physician,
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 two consulting physicians, the ombudsman; and, where either of the
 two best-interests tests are used, the patient's family or next of kin.
 These problems seem to flow from a too narrow reading of the
 facts. For example, pain was seen as a major issue by all parties, but
 there was conflicting evidence about Ms. Conroy's pain at the trial
 level. Pain is a major issue, but it should not be the only issue. The
 central issue is, as the court makes clear in most of its opinion, the
 wishes of the patient if they can be discerned, and, if not, the patient's
 best interests.
 Likewise, the attempt to limit the opinion to encompass only
 nursing home patients is troubling and fatally flawed. It neglects the
 fact that all of the relevant medical decisions regarding Claire Conroy
 were made not in the nursing home at all, but during her four-month
 stay at the Clara Maas Hospital, where her nasogastric tube was
 inserted, removed, and reinserted, and where her guardian first requested
 that it be permanently removed. The dichotomy between nursing
 home and hospital is not only artificial and misleading in Ms. Conroy's
 case, it is artificial in the case of almost every elderly patient. Almost
 all will be transferred to hospitals when they require invasive treatment,
 and a large number of them will initially enter the nursing home via
 a hospital. The reasons provided by the court suggest a procedure
 that might be different in degree, but not so extreme as to set one
 up different in kind. The five reasons given are the patients' average
 age; their lack of surviving parents, siblings, or children; the limited
 role of physicians in nursing homes; general understaffing and reports
 of inhumane treatment; and the less urgent types of treatment decisions
 that are made in nursing homes. Of these, the patient's age, family
 status, and needed treatment, are all unaffected by the physical setting.
 This leaves the lack of physician contact and the general bad impression
 one has about nursing homes as justifying different kinds of procedures.
 Neither is sufficiently persuasive. Almost all previous nontreatment
 court cases have originated in hospitals, and this seems to be the
 setting in which patient wishes are most frequently ignored. There
 are more treatment decisions per patient per day made in hospitals,
 but the court gives us no reason to assume that they are made so
 much better. By focusing on the nursing home setting, the court
 tended to ignore the plight of Claire Conroy, just as the Quinlan court
 wound up concentrating on physician liability and ignoring the interests
 of Karen Ann Quinlan herself (Annas 1985). Because of this failure
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 and the extremely complex procedural mechanisms employed, the
 "New Jersey" solution is not likely to be a useful one for other states
 to follow.
 Responsibility of Hospital and Physicians to Patient Who
 Refuses Life-sustaining Treatment (Including Transfer)
 The thrust of almost all of the judicial decisions to date has been to
 grant prospective legal immunity to physicians for following the wishes
 of competent patients or their legal guardians. In a few rare instances,
 however, physicians may refuse to honor the wishes of a competent
 patient. Traditional abandonment principles require physicians to find
 another physician to care for these patients if they require continued
 care (Annas 1975).
 Anticipating this problem, as noted above, the New Jersey Supreme
 Court in the Quinlan case explicitly gave Mr. Quinlan, as guardian,
 the legal authority to seek out other physicians for his daughter.
 Competent patients, of course, retain the right to hire and fire their
 individual physicians as well. But what if, for some reason, alternate
 physicians cannot be found? Is the competent patient's physician then
 at liberty to ignore the patient's wishes, or is the physician obligated
 to follow them even if following them is against his best medical
 judgment or his conscience?
 This difficult question was addressed directly in the case of William
 Bartling, a 70-year-old man confined to an intensive care unit, and
 intubated with a mechanical ventilator, who asked that the ventilator
 be removed."9 His physicians, conceding that Mr. Bartling was com-
 petent, nonetheless refused to remove the ventilator because it would
 cause his death and they did not think this was a proper action for
 a physician to take. The hospital in which Mr. Bartling was residing,
 Glendale Adventist Hospital, aggressively opposed their patient and
 went to court to argue against removal of the ventilator. Attempts
 by Mr. Bartling's lawyer to find other physicians for him were un-
 successful because of the publicity generated by the case.
 A lower court refused to order the physicians to remove the ventilator.
 39 Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1984).
This content downloaded from 
            128.197.229.194 on Tue, 14 Dec 2021 14:29:03 UTC             
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 132 George J. Annas and Leonard H. Glantz
 The day before the appeals court heard the case, Mr. Bartling died,
 still in the hospital on the ventilator. Accordingly, the primary issue
 the appeals court had to address was the obligation of a physician
 and hospital to fulfill the patient's wishes when transfer was impossible.
 The court found that Mr. Bartling had a constitutionally guaranteed
 right to refuse treatment and that the strongest argument that the
 physicians and hospital could make was that the hospital, Glendale
 Adventist, was a "Christian, pro-life oriented hospital, the majority
 of whose doctors would view disconnecting a life-support system in
 a case such as this as inconsistent with the healing orientation of
 physicians." The court, while not doubting the sincerity of these
 ethical beliefs, was emphatic that in a conflict, the patient's interests are
 paramount and must control:
 If the right to self-determination as to his own medical treatment
 is to have any meaning at all, it must be paramount to the interests
 of the patient's hospital and doctors. The right of a competent
 adult patient to refuse medical treatment is a constitutionally guar-
 anteed right which must not be abridged.
 Previous cases are in accord with this view.40 Indeed, the court went
 further in a footnote, saying that if Mr. Bartling was still alive, it
 would have issued the following order:
 ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that William Francis Bartling, in
 the exercise of his right of privacy, may remain in defendant hospital
 or leave said hospital free of the mechanical respirator now attached
 to his body and all defendants and their staffs are restrained from
 interfering with Mr. Bartling's decision.
 A majority of states now have "living will" statutes which provide
 a mechanism for a patient to refuse treatment after he or she is no
 longer competent. Using a document called a "living will" or prior
 declaration, a patient can set forth his or her wishes concerning
 cessation or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment after becoming
 40Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977);
 Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160 (Fla. App. 1978), Affd 379 So.2d 359
 (Fla. 1980).
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 incompetent. In such cases it may happen that their attending physician
 disagrees with their decision or refuses to carry it out for "ethical"
 reasons. These statutes generally require the physician to transfer the
 patient to a physician who will carry out the terms of the declaration.
 Likewise, the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, adopted by
 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
 August 1985 provides, in Section 6: "An Attending physician or
 other health-care provider who is unwilling to comply with this Act
 shall as promptly as practicable take all reasonable steps to transfer
 care of the declarant to another physician or health-care provider."
 This uniform act, and other living will statutes are discussed in detail
 in the following section of this article.
 Legislative Approaches to Withholding and Withdrawing
 Life-sustaining Treatment for Elderly
 Incompetent Patients
 Recent debate has centered on four basic legislative approaches to
 protecting the rights of adults in the context of medical treatment
 decisions: "living will" statutes, durable power of attorney statutes,
 guardianship, and adult protective services and public guardianship.
 The last three are generic approaches designed to perform all or most
 of the tasks needed by elderly or incompetent individuals. The first,
 "living wills," is the only one specifically designed to permit a currently
 competent individual to have some say about medical treatment after
 the individual becomes incompetent to participate in treatment decisions.
 Because of their generality, the last three schemes will be dealt with
 rather cursorily, with major attention focused on living will proposals.
 Guardianship
 As specifically applied to medical treatment decisions, guardianship
 has already been discussed in some detail. Some more general obser-
 vations, however, seem appropriate as they relate to measures the
 legislature might take to improve guardianship as a means to protect
 patients. A guardian is a judicially appointed individual who makes
 decisions on behalf of an incompetent individual, termed a ward. All
 states have statutes that provide for the appointment of a guardian
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 in certain circumstances under the state's parens patriae power. Although
 the purpose of guardianship is to protect the ward, allegations are
 frequently made that the system often actually devalues the elderly,
 who are viewed as useless and burdensome (Butler 1975; Nolan 1984).
 Procedures differ between states, but, in general, a court must
 formally declare an individual incompetent to make certain decisions
 in order to appoint a guardian to make decisions for him. With the
 number of guardianship petitions increasing sharply in recent years,
 however, courts have been criticized for giving very little time to
 each case, and often making determinations with little or no evidence
 and without the legal representation of the ward (Sherman 1980;
 Dewey 1965).
 A petition for guardianship may usually be filed by any interested
 party, with notice sent to the alleged incompetent person. This notice
 requirement can be waived by the judge in some jurisdictions, and
 often is when the prospective ward is in a hospital. The quality of
 the notice also varies, and may not convey what is at stake to the
 alleged incompetent. The alleged incompetent is often not present at
 the hearing, and is rarely represented by counsel. There is commonly
 no evidence presented on his behalf (Regan 1985). This happens
 although all states permit the alleged incompetent to be represented
 by counsel.
 The theory under which guardianship proceedings have become
 one-sided, nonadversarial proceedings is that their intent is to protect
 and benefit the ward, so an adversarial proceeding is not seen as needed
 and is not deemed appropriate. This does not seem to reflect reality,
 and a requirement of such representation would be much more protective
 of the alleged incompetent.
 The court may grant the guardian carefully defined "limited" or
 "partial" powers to perform specific tasks or "plenary powers" to make
 all decisions on behalf of the ward (Frolik 1981). The two can also
 be "combined," as in the Quinlan case where her father sought both
 plenary guardianship powers, and, in addition, specific authority to
 order the removal of the ventilator.41 The guardian's plenary powers
 have been divided into three areas: (1) disposition of the ward's financial
 assets and income; (2) decisions about where and with whom the ward
 41 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
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 will live; and (3) decisions about medical treatment (Kapp 1985).
 Limited or partial guardianship statutes may require that the guardian's
 powers be delineated as narrowly as possible (e.g., Illinois), or they
 may permit, but not require, such a narrow grant of authority (e.g.,
 Wisconsin).
 Once appointed, the guardian is usually obligated to make decisions
 consistent with the previously expressed values and preferences of the
 ward (substituted judgment) or alternatively, to make decisions ob-
 jectively in the "best interests" of the ward (best interests). Elderly
 incompetent individuals often have no friend or relative willing or
 able to act as their guardian. This problem has prompted a number
 of states to develop some form of "public guardianship" under which
 a government agency can function as a guardian of last resort.
 Adult Protective Services and Public Guardianship
 Adult protective services have their genesis primarily in federal law,
 specifically Titles VI and XX of the Social Security Act. The general
 definition was developed in 1975 under Title VI (Grants to States
 for Services to the Aged, Blind or Disabled):
 Protective services means a system of service (including medical
 and legal services which are incidental to the service plan) which
 are utilized to assist seriously impaired eligible individuals who,
 because of mental or physical dysfunction, are unable to manage
 their own resources, carry out the activities of daily living, or
 protect themselves from neglect or hazardous situations without
 assistance from others and have no one available who is willing
 and able to assist them responsibly (45 CFR 222.73).
 In 1981, Title XX of the Social Security Act (Block Grants to
 States for Social Services) encouraged the establishment of protective
 services for "adults unable to protect their own interests." States have
 responded in various ways, many concentrating on the prevention of
 "elder abuse and neglect." In this sense, adult protective services are
 the analog to "child abuse and neglect" programs, aimed at preventing
 abuse and neglect in a specific portion of the population. As previously
 discussed, New Jersey's elder abuse scheme has been adopted by its
 highest court as the appropriate method to investigate and rule on
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 termination of treatment decisions involving elderly nursing home
 patients in certain circumstances.42
 Virtually all states provide some form of adult protective services
 under Title XX (Burr 1982). The program consists of social service
 intervention. When this is not sufficient, however, the courts will be
 used to help "manage" the adult for his own benefit. When an
 appropriate individual is not available to be appointed as a guardian,
 a public agency may be utilized to fill this role.
 Public guardianship generally refers to a state or local governmental
 agency designated to act as guardian by the court in those cases where
 the incompetent individual has no friends or relatives available to
 serve in this capacity (Schmidt et al. 1981). Most states have explicit
 or implicit statutory provision for public guardianship; some rely on
 regulations and policies developed under their adult protection services
 (Burr 1982; Schmidt et al. 1981). When a specific agency is appointed
 to serve as a public guardian, it is usually the same agency that is
 in charge of the ward's social welfare services, even though this presents
 enormous potential conflict of interest (Schmidt et al. 1981). The
 system could be greatly strengthened from the wards' perspective if
 public guardianship agencies were completely independent of service
 agencies, although some have suggested that the system can be so
 repressive that it should be abolished altogether, and public agencies
 limited to providing services to willing clients (Regan 1982).
 Durable Power of Attorney
 A power of attorney is a written instrument in which one person (the
 principal) confirms the authority of another (the "attorney" or agent)
 to perform specific tasks on the principal's behalf. In common law
 the power of such an individual agent or attorney was automatically
 revoked when the principal died or became legally incapacitated (Fowler
 1974). This rule was designed to protect the principal's "right of
 supervision" over the agent. Thus, an ordinary power of attorney
 could not be used to delegate decision-making authority in the event
 of mental incompetency, since the "triggering" event is simultaneously
 the event that terminates the agent's authority to act (President's
 42 In the Matter of Claire Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
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 Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
 Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1983, 144) Because the power
 terminated precisely when it became needed to make medical decisions,
 it could not be used for this purpose. This deficiency, and the problems
 with formal petitioning for guardianship, including the time and
 expense involved, prompted the search for a new solution in the form
 of a "durable power of attorney," i.e., an agency authorization that
 survived the later incapacity of the principal.
 A few states adopted the durable power of attorney strategy early.
 But it was not until 1979 when the National Conference of Com-
 missioners on Uniform State Laws included the "Uniform Durable
 Power of Attorney Act" in the provisions of the Uniform Probate
 Code (Effland 1975) that large numbers of states began to adopt
 language identical or similar to that set forth in Section 5-501 et
 seq. of the Uniform Probate Code. The operative section, 5-502,
 provides:
 All acts done by an attorney-in-fact pursuant to a durable power
 of attorney during any period of disability or incapacity of the
 principal have the same effect and inure to the benefit of and bind
 the principal and his successor in interest as if the principal were
 competent and not disabled.
 To avoid potential conflicts with a court-appointed guardian or
 conservator, the Uniform Probate Code (Sec. 5-503) provides that the
 guardian has the same power to revoke or amend the power of attorney
 as the principal would have had if he were not incapacitated, and
 that the court shall make appointment of a guardian in accordance
 with the principal's most recent nomination (in a durable power of
 attorney) except "for good cause or disqualification."
 All 50 states now explicitly permit a principal to execute a durable
 power of attorney by statute, with only the District of Columbia still
 having no enabling legislation (Collin et al. 1984). The statutes do,
 however, vary in some respects. Most notably, they either become
 effective immediately ("immediate power") and remain unaffected by
 subsequent incapacity of the principal, or, alternatively, they may be
 permitted to take effect only upon the incapacitation of the principal
 ("springing power," i.e., springs into effectiveness upon incapacity)
 (Collin et al. 1984).
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 Nothing in their language in any way precludes or limits the use
 of durable power of attorney statutes as a device for delegating medical
 decision-making authority, and no court has ever ruled that they
 possess such a limitation. The President's Commission for the Study
 of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
 (1983, 147) noting the "flexibility of the statutes" that permits "directives
 to be drafted that are sensitive both to the different needs of patients
 in appointing proxy decisionmakers and to the range of situations in
 which decisions may have to be made," encourages the use of existing
 durable power of attorney statutes "to facilitate decision-making for
 incapacitated persons." The commission did, however, note the "pos-
 sibility of abuse inherent in the statutes" that did not contain even
 the types of due process requirements of a guardianship petition.
 Accordingly, it called for careful study of what additional safeguards
 might be required based on experience with this device.
 Procedural safeguards are important, but as the guardianship ex-
 perience has demonstrated, they may add more to form than substance
 in protecting the principal (Regan 1985). California, for example,
 recently enacted a durable power of attorney statute specifically tailored
 for medical decision making. Its provisions are so complex and cum-
 bersome, however, that the statutory procedures are unlikely to be
 used except in the most exceptional cases. Thus, while due process
 may be achieved, the price is making the device almost useless. Other
 states that have adopted statutes specifically dealing with the durable
 power of attorney's application to medical decision making are Delaware,
 Virginia, and Pennsylvania. Delaware's provisions are especially rigorous
 in regard to the qualification of witnesses to the document, disqualifying
 anyone related by blood or marriage, entitled to take any portion of
 the principal's estate, financially responsible for medical care of the
 principal, or employed by the hospital or facility in which the principal
 is a patient.43 We believe the procedural problems can be remedied
 in the medical treatment context by combining the durable power of
 attorney with an explicit "living will." This is discussed in detail in
 the section that follows.
 43 Del. Code Ann. Title 16, Sec. 2503(b) (5) 1983.
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 Living Will and Natural Death Acts
 Overview
 The term "living will" was coined by Luis Kutner in 1969; it describes
 a document in which a competent adult sets forth his wishes concerning
 medical treatment in the event he becomes incapacitated in the future
 (Kutner 1969). In this sense, it is like a "will," but since it takes
 effect prior to death, it is termed a "living" will. More than five
 million such documents have been distributed by Concern for Dying,
 a New York educational organization, over the past decade. Public
 interest is intense in this mechanism, but due to the absence of specific
 judicial sanction, and the lack of clear rules regarding their execution
 and use, many individuals and organizations, like the Society for the
 Right to Die, have long advocated that states pass specific statutes
 supporting the "living will."
 California enacted the first living will statute in 1976, designating
 it a "natural death act," a term that many other states have used as
 well. California should receive considerable credit for enacting the
 first statute, but the price was very high. The statute is extremely
 narrow. A "binding" declaration can only be executed fourteen days
 or more after the declarant has been diagnosed as suffering from a
 terminal illness, making the person a "qualified patient." In order to
 qualify as "terminal," death must be "imminent," i.e., the patient
 must be dying soon whether or not life-sustaining procedures are used.
 As the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
 Medicine and Biomedical and Behaviorial Research (1983, 142) has
 noted, the fourteen-day waiting period under such circumstances requires
 "a miraculous cure, a misdiagnosis, or a very loose interpretation of
 the word 'imminent' in order for the directive to be of any use to
 the patient."
 Even though the California statute was inspired in part by the
 Quinlan case, as Professor Alexander Capron (1978) has noted, the
 statute does not apply to cases like hers because Karen was not
 terminally ill and her death was not imminent:
 The only patients covered by this statute are those who are on the
 edge of death despite the doctors' efforts. The very people for whom
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 the greatest concern is expressed about a prolonged and undignified
 dying process are unaffected by the statute because their deaths are
 not imminent.
 Most states have similar limitations on the individuals covered,
 generally denoting them "terminally ill." This removes from their
 protection the very categories of patients who are likely to need this
 protection the most, patients like Earle Spring, William Bartling,
 and Claire Conroy. As the President's Commission for the Study of
 Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
 (1983, 142) noted, "such a limitation greatly reduces an act's potential."
 By January 1985, 22 states and the District of Columbia had
 enacted legislation; and by the end of 1986 at least 20 additional
 states had enacted legislation on this subject. All of the statutes are
 different and none is ideal. All statutes include specific instructions
 which must be followed in the execution of an advanced directive,
 and most set out a model directive in the statute itself. Some contain
 California's "imminent" dying language, and some permit the declarant
 to refuse only "artificial life-sustaining procedures."
 Three states (Florida, Louisiana, and Virginia) expressly recognize
 oral directives as well as written ones, while most of the others
 expressly require a "writing." Four states (Arkansas, Illinois, Nevada,
 and New Mexico) require that the declaration be executed in conformance
 with the laws of the state regarding execution of a will. Almost all
 statutes require the declarant to attest that he or she is of sound mind
 at the time of the execution of the declaration, and more than a dozen
 states require attestation to the voluntariness of the act as well (Gilmore
 and Thorpe 1985).
 Revocation is dealt with in all the statutes, but the circumstances
 under which a declaration can be revoked vary, including cancellation,
 destruction, written revocation, and oral revocation. Most states require
 communication of the revocation to the attending physician as well.
 Penalties for not following advance directives are few. The California
 statute stipulates that a physician's failure to follow a binding declaration,
 or transfer the patient to a physician who will, shall constitute un-
 professional conduct. The Texas statute says only that such an act
 may constitute unprofessional conduct. The vast majority of statutes
 contain no penalties at all.
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 Major Limitations of Current Statutes
 In addition to their lack of uniformity, the potential conflict of laws
 raises the question of the statutory differences when someone dies in
 a state other than the one in which his declaration was executed.
 Current "living will" statutes also suffer from the following general
 infirmities:
 1. They are generally restricted to the terminally ill, and thus
 exclude from their protection the vast majority of elderly individuals,
 and the term "terminally ill" is so vague that it is subject to arbitrary
 interpretation and application;
 2. They generally limit the types of treatment a person can refuse
 to "artificial" or "extraordinary," thus excluding many burdensome
 treatments, and the vagueness of these terms leads to arbitrary
 interpretations;
 3. They do not permit an individual to designate another person
 to act on his behalf (like a durable power of attorney) and do not set
 forth criteria under which the person so designated is to exercise this
 authority, thus greatly restricting the usefulness of the document in
 cases not precisely predicted by the individual;
 4. They do not require health care providers to follow the patient's
 wishes as set forth in the declaration, thus the rights of the patient
 are not seen as superior to those of the health care providers;
 5. They do not explicitly require health care providers to continue
 palliative care to a patient who refuses other medical interventions.
 Because of these shortcomings, "living will" statutes are unlikely
 to help resolve the many complex issues discussed in the previous
 sections of this article. As presently drafted, what these statutes primarily
 do is provide that if a patient is terminally ill, and if the physician
 can do nothing to sustain the patient's life, and if the patient does
 not want his life sustained, and the doctor agrees with the patient's
 decision, then the doctor may (but does not have to) follow the patient's
 desire, and be assured criminal and civil immunity for his actions.
 Two major approaches have been suggested to help remedy the
 current unsatisfactory state of living will legislation: the approach of
 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
 to draft a uniform act that clarifies existing legislation; and the approach
 of the Legal Advisers of Concern for Dying, to draft a "second generation"
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 act that advances the rights of patients by directly addressing the
 shortcomings discussed above.
 The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act
 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
 charged its drafting committee to develop a uniform state living will
 statute, but imposed a number of critical limitations. Most important,
 the statute was to be limited to patients in a "terminal condition,"
 and the use of proxies or a built-in durable power of attorney was
 precluded. Accordingly, the act does not (and could not) deal with
 these two critical limitations of the current statutes. The act also
 restricts itself to competent adults, thus excluding mature minors
 from its coverage, and limits the types of treatment that can be refused
 to those that "serve only to prolong the dying process."
 But developing a more useful or more comprehensive model statute
 was not the drafting committee's purpose. Instead, as stated in their
 final "draft for approval," the purposes of the uniform act are threefold:
 (1) to encourage the effectiveness of a declaration in states other than
 the state in which it is executed through uniformity of scope and
 procedure, (2) to avoid the inconsistency in approach and quality
 which have characterized the early statutes, and (3) to present an act
 which is simple, effective, and acceptable to persons desiring to execute
 a declaration and to physicians and health care facilities whose conduct
 will be affected.
 Goals 1 and 2 are modest and are, by definition, achieved by a
 "uniform act." Goal 3, however, is much more elusive and although
 the act is "simple" and "acceptable," its "effectiveness" depends upon
 one's criteria for judgment. The full text of the act is set forth in
 appendix 1.
 Specific attention is drawn to the following provisions.
 Two definitions merit comment. First, "life-sustaining treatment"
 is defined as "any medical procedure or intervention that, when ad-
 ministered to a qualified patient, will serve only to prolong the dying
 process." The type of treatment a patient can refuse is thus limited
 to those which only serve to "prolong the dying process." It is unlikely
 there are any such treatments, and, if they exist, neither medical
 ethics nor medical practice sanctions administering such "treatment"
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 to a patient. Thus, if this definition is taken seriously, the act has
 no or almost no application in the real world. Second, "terminal
 condition" is defined as "an incurable or irreversible condition that,
 without the administration of life-sustaining treatment, will, in the
 opinion of the attending physician, result in death within a relatively
 short time." Like the California progenitor, and most other existing
 statutes, this limitation to "terminally ill" patients drastically restricts
 the application of the statute, and will lead to all of the problems
 caused by the term "imminent," since there is little, if any, difference
 between "imminent" death, and "death within a relatively short time."
 It does, however, properly limit the use of this term to the time
 without "the administration of life-sustaining treatment," thus not
 requiring that death come soon "whether or not" treatment is continued.
 The definitional limitations mean the act would not apply to people
 like Karen Quinlan, Earle Spring, Claire Conroy, or William Bartling.
 The revocation section (3a) provides that "a declaration may be
 revoked at any time and in any manner by the declarant without
 regard to mental or physical condition." This simply seems to be a
 mistake. The revocation of a declaration by an incompetent patient
 or one unable to understand what he or she is doing should not be
 effective, since it negates the very essence of what the act seeks to
 promote: self-determination.
 The pregnancy limitation section (5d) appears unconstitutional when
 applied to the period of pregnancy prior to fetal viability, and the
 reason for discriminating against terminally ill pregnant women in
 this manner seems unjustified. Many statutes have similar provisions,
 and all seem designed to deprive pregnant women of the right to
 refuse treatment they would otherwise possess.
 The transfer section (6) provides: "An attending physician or other
 health-care provider who is unwilling to comply with this act shall
 as promptly as practicable take all reasonable steps to transfer care of
 the declarant to another physician or health-care provider." This should
 be the heart of the act. Unfortunately it begs the relevant question:
 What do "all reasonable steps" mean, and what if after taking them
 the physician is still unable to transfer the patient? If one believes
 in taking the rights of patients seriously, the act should require the
 physician to either transfer "as promptly as practicable" or to carry
 out the wishes of the patient if transfer is not promptly arranged,
 even if the health care provider disagrees with them.
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 The second part of the immunity section (7b) provides: "A physician
 or other health-care provider, whose actions under this act are in
 accord with reasonable medical standards, is not subject to criminal
 or civil liability or discipline for unprofessional conduct." This provision
 is extremely curious. It seems to permit the physician to do whatever
 he or she wants regardless of the patient's stated views in the declaration,
 as long as those actions "are in accord with reasonable medical standards."
 If this interpretation is correct, this provision invalidates all of the
 otherwise mandatory aspects of the act by permitting physicians to
 do whatever is "in accord with reasonable medical standards," which,
 one must presume, was the law prior to enactment of the act.
 Finally, there are penalties for failure to transfer, willfully failing
 to record a determination, willfully concealing, cancelling or defacing
 or forging a declaration, etc. But there are no penalties for failure to
 follow a declaration. This, of course, should be the whole point of the
 act, and without a penalty for failure to follow the declarant's wishes,
 physicians are left in the same "optional" position they were in prior
 to the act.
 In short, while the act does provide a uniform approach, it is not
 a particularly useful one since it severely limits its application to tiny
 categories of patients and treatments. Moreover, it does not provide
 for a proxy or setting standards for proxy decision making; does not
 require health professionals to follow the terms of the declaration; and
 does not explicitly require the provision of palliative care. Thus, the
 act addresses only one major shortcoming of current laws: the lack
 of uniformity. It leaves the other five major shortcomings intact;
 worse, it seems to institutionalize and approve them.
 The Right to Refuse Treatment Act
 In addition to the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, three
 other major model statutes have been developed on the subject of
 consent to medical treatment. All were reviewed and discussed by
 the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
 Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1983, 147-48).
 The first, the Society for the Right to Die's "Medical Treatment
 Decision Act" is substantially identical to many of the existing natural
 death acts and so shares their problems. As the President's Commission
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 described it, it "shares the narrowness of application of most such
 acts and makes no explicit provision for designating a proxy for medical
 decision making."
 The second proposal is, like the Uniform Act, from the National
 Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It is entitled
 a "Model Health Care Consent Act." Unfortunately, despite its title,
 it does not have consent as its central concern. As the President's
 Commission correctly noted, it should more accurately be described
 as a "substitute authority to decide act." And even in this area it is
 extremely narrow and "imprecise." The President's Commission properly
 criticized it for failure to provide any guidance on what standard a
 proxy should use in making health care decisions, imprecision in the
 determination of capacity to consent, and uncertain provisions regarding
 revocation and redelegation of authority. A leading commentator de-
 scribed it as "confused and ultimately misguided," and thought it
 could be more accurately entitled "The Summer Camp Health Care
 Act" (Capron 1983). It does not address the major issues discussed
 in this article.
 The third proposal is the "Right to Refuse Treatment Act," a
 "second generation" living will act developed by the Legal Advisers
 Committee of Concern for Dying and set forth in its entirety in
 appendix 2 (Concern for Dying. Legal Advisers Committee 1983;
 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
 and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1983, 428-31). Of this act
 the President's Commission wrote:
 The Act enunciates competent adults' right to refuse treatment and
 provides a mechanism by which competent people can both state
 how they wish to be treated in the event of incompetence and name
 another person to enforce those wishes. In terms of its treatment of
 such central issues as the capacity to consent and the standard by which
 a proxy decision-maker is to act, the Uniform Right to Refuse Treatment
 Act is carefully crafted and in conformity with the Commission's conclusions.
 Greater opportunity for review of determinations of incompetency
 and of proxy's decisions may be needed, however, to protect patients'
 self-determination and welfare [emphasis added].
 The act has been introduced in the Florida and Massachusetts
 legislatures. Following a lower court decision in Massachusetts in the
 case of Paul Brophy, a 43-year-old former fire fighter and EMT, which
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 refused to permit the withdrawal of artificial nutrition via a gastrostomy
 tube on Mr. Brophy although he was in a persistent vegetative state,
 and despite a judicial finding that he would refuse such artificial
 feeding if he was competent, the Boston Globe editorially recommended
 the act to the state legislature. This recommendation was based on
 the fact that unlike other current statutes and proposals, the act would
 specifically permit patients to refuse any treatment, including artificial
 feeding, through a living will and/or designation of a proxy to make
 this decision consistent with their desires. The lower court decision
 was reversed in 1986 and the hospital ordered to transfer Mr. Brophy
 to a facility that would comply with his wishes.44
 Most sections of the Right to Refuse Treatment Act are self-ex-
 planatory, but some deserve specific comment. No model form or
 document is included, because the drafters believed that the individual's
 wishes would be more likely to be precisely expressed if they were
 required to be set forth in his own words. The right affirmed by the
 act is the right to refuse treatment, as viewed as implicit in any
 meaningful concept of individual liberty. Living will statutes, on the
 other hand, have often relied on a vaguely articulated "right to die"
 notion that has no legal pedigree. Both adults and mature minors are
 included in the purview of the act, because the drafters believed that
 minors who understand and appreciate the nature and consequences
 of their actions should be afforded self-determination and not forced
 to undergo medical treatment against their will.
 To meet the objections of narrowness in the other acts, this act
 aims at protecting the autonomy of all competent individuals, not
 just those who have been diagnosed as "terminally ill," because all
 persons merit respect and autonomy. Moreover, if we do not raise
 our sensitivity regarding respect for the nonterminally ill patient's
 right to autonomy, it is extremely unlikely that the rights of terminally
 ill patients will be afforded respect. The act would also apply to
 patients like Karen Ann Quinlan and Paul Brophy, who although in
 hopeless, persistent vegetative states, did not suffer from an underlying,
 terminal illness. It would also apply to patients like Earle Spring and
 William Bartling (Concern for Dying. Legal Advisers Committee
 1983).
 44 In re Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986).
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 The most critical definition in the act is that of "competence,"
 which is defined as the ability to "understand and appreciate the na-
 ture and consequences of a decision to accept or reject treatment." The
 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
 and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1981, 159) noted that "by
 combining a proxy directive with specific instructions, an individual
 could control both the content and the process of decision-making
 about care in case of incapacity." The act incorporates this suggestion
 by permitting the declarant to define both what interventions are
 refused (including artificial feeding), and to name an authorized individual
 to make decisions consistent with his desires as expressed in the
 declaration.
 The Right to Refuse Treatment Act recognizes that some health
 care providers may have different belief systems than their patients,
 and attempts to outline a realistic transfer procedure that respects the
 ethical views of both parties. The act recognizes, however, that the
 patient is most immediately affected by the treatment-refusal decision,
 since the patient's own future and quality of living and dying is at
 stake. Consequently, it provides that a patient's directive must prevail
 over the physician's views in the rare occasion where transfer is impossible.
 This may seem harsh, but the drafters believed that the balance
 between the physician's personal ethics (or the ethics of the medical
 profession) and the liberty interest of the patient would always be
 tipped in the patient's favor by the patient's interest in being free
 from nonconsensual medical interventions.45
 Providers who follow the procedures outlined in the act are relieved
 of liability under any civil, criminal, or administrative action. On
 the other hand, providers who abandon their patients or refuse to
 comply with valid declarations are subject to punishment. These
 offenders may face civil actions including charges of negligence and
 battery, and administrative sanctions including license revocation and
 suspension.
 Other important sections of the act make it clear that this method
 of refusing treatment is not exclusive, that refusal of treatment is not
 suicide, does not affect insurance policies, and that regardless of
 4 Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977);
 Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1984).
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 refusals, palliative care must be given unless it is specifically refused
 by the patient. No time limit is placed on the validity of the declaration,
 just as there is no time limit on ordinary wills or on donations made
 under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. Nonetheless, those who
 worry that the declaration might not reflect the currently held views
 of the patient will want to add some provision for updating or reaffirming
 one's advance declaration. The primary protection regarding the wishes
 of the patient is the requirement for two witnesses to certify that they
 believe the person understood what he was signing and did so voluntarily.
 The drafters did not restrict the individuals who can either be witnesses
 or authorized persons, because they believed this unnecessarily implied
 bad faith on the part of whole categories of individuals (e.g., relatives,
 those making the will, health providers), and unnecessarily restricts
 the autonomy of an individual to pick his own witnesses and proxies.
 Those who disagree with this analysis, as the President's Commission
 may have, will want to consider disqualifying certain individuals who
 seem to have a built-in conflict of interest with the declarant.
 An additional protection of the declarant is that revocation is made
 simple. But the intent to revoke must be specific. Merely signing a
 blanket hospital admissions form that "consents" to whatever treatment
 physicians at the hospital may wish to render is insufficient indication
 of revocation of a declaration. While a relative may sabotage a patient's
 wishes (by reporting a verbal revocation that did not in fact take
 place), the act relies on good faith and criminal penalties to discourage
 this practice.
 In summary, the act is designed to promote the autonomy of
 competent individuals and respect for their decisions by enhancing
 their right to accept or reject medical treatments recommended by
 their health care providers. It protects all patients who were once
 competent, both while they are competent, and, if they execute a
 declaration, after they become incompetent. It provides that patients
 may execute a written, signed declaration setting forth their intentions
 on treatment and refusal decisions and permits them to designate
 authorized individuals to make treatment decisions on their behalf
 should they become incompetent in the future. The act upholds and
 clarifies recognized patient rights consistent with the ethics of the
 medical profession and shields complying physicians, witnesses, and
 authorized persons acting in good faith from legal liability and provides
 penalties for those who violate its provisions.
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 Of course, there are major limitations to this act as well. Primarily,
 it applies only to competent individuals who either refuse treatment
 while competent, or actually execute a declaration while competent.
 It does not apply to those individuals who were never competent, or
 to formerly competent individuals who never executed a declaration.
 Thus, it leaves the issue of what to do with these categories of
 individuals unresolved.
 Conclusion
 The individual's right to self-determination in deciding whether to
 accept recommended medical care hinges upon the doctrine of informed
 consent and the constitutional right of privacy. The appellate courts
 have been remarkably consistent in enunciating and enforcing this
 right, and in permitting competent individuals to refuse any medical
 intervention. For the elderly patient the right to self-determination
 is often lost due to a health care provider's or trial court's wrongful
 assumption of incompetence. To protect the elderly, their competence
 must be judged on the same basis as everyone else's: an ability to
 understand and appreciate the information needed to give an informed
 consent. The appellate courts are in accord on these issues, and current
 debate continues primarily around defining when, if ever, the state
 has a sufficiently compelling interest in forcing treatment on a patient.
 Pregnancy and child-dependency have been the major such potential
 interests cited, but neither is likely to apply to the elderly. Although
 their rights are clear, the remedy is often difficult, especially when
 the health care provider refuses to either follow the patient's decisions
 or transfer the patient. While courts will enforce the rights of the
 patient, health care providers should honor patient decisions without
 resort to the courts. Appropriate legislation might serve both to codify
 existing rights, and to clarify mechanisms to enforce and enhance
 them.
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 Appendix 1
 Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act
 Section 1. Definitions
 In this [Act]:
 (1) "Attending physician" means the physician who has primary
 responsibility for the treatment and care of the patient.
 (2) "Declaration" means a writing executed in accordance with the
 requirements of Section 2(a).
 (3) "Health-care provider" means a person who is licensed, certified,
 or otherwise authorized by the law of this State to administer
 health care in the ordinary course of business or practice of a
 profession.
 (4) "Life-sustaining treatment" means any medical procedure or
 intervention that, when administered to a qualified patient,
 will serve only to prolong the dying process.
 (5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate,
 trust, partnership, association, government, governmental sub-
 division or agency, or any other legal entity.
 (6) "Physician" means an individual [licensed to practice medicine
 in this State].
 (7) "Qualified patient" means a patient [181 years of age or older
 who has executed a declaration and who has been determined
 by the attending physician to be in a terminal condition.
 (8) "State" means a state, territory, possession, or commonwealth
 of the United States and the District of Columbia.
 (9) "Terminal condition" means an incurable or irreversible condition
 that, without the administration of life-sustaining treatment,
 will, in the opinion of the attending physician, result in death
 within a relatively short time.
 Section 2. Declaration Relating to Use of
 Life-sustaining Treatment
 (a) Any individual of sound mind and [ 181 years of age or older
 may at any time execute a declaration governing the withholding
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 or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. The declaration must
 be signed by the declarant, or another at the declarant's direction,
 and witnessed by 2 individuals.
 (b) A declaration may, but need not, be in the following form:
 Declaration
 If I should have an incurable or irreversible condition
 that will cause my death within a relatively short time, and if
 I am no longer able to make decisions regarding my medical
 treatment, I direct my attending physician, pursuant to the
 I Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act),
 to withhold or withdraw treatment that only prolongs the dying
 process and is not necessary to my comfort or to alleviate pain.
 Signed this day of
 Signature
 Address





 (c) A physician or other health-care provider who is provided a
 copy of the declaration shall make it a part of the declarant's
 medical record and, if unwilling to comply with its provisions,
 promptly so advise the declarant.
 Section 3. Revocation of Declaration
 (a) A declaration may be revoked at any time and in any manner
 by the declarant without regard to mental or physical condition.
 A revocation is effective upon communication to the attending
 physician or other health-care provider by the declarant or by
 another who witnessed the revocation.
 (b) The attending physician or other health-care provider shall make
 the revocation a part of the declarant's medical record.
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 Section 4. Recording Determination of Terminal
 Condition and Declaration
 Upon determining that the declarant is in a terminal condition,
 the attending physician who knows of a declaration shall record the
 determination and the terms of the declaration in the declarant's
 medical record.
 Section 5. Treatment of Qualified Patients
 (a) A qualified patient has the right to make decisions regarding
 life-sustaining treatment as long as the patient is able to do
 SO.
 (b) A declaration becomes operative when (1) the declaration is
 communicated to the attending physician and (2) the declarant
 is determined by the attending physician to be in a terminal
 condition and no longer able to make decisions regarding ad-
 ministration of life-sustaining treatment. When the declaration
 becomes operative, the attending physician and other health-
 care providers shall act in accordance with its provisions or
 comply with the transfer provisions of Section 6.
 (c) This [Act] does not affect the responsibility of the attending
 physician or other health-care provider to provide treatment,
 including nutrition and hydration, for comfort, care, or alleviation
 of pain.
 (d) Unless the declaration otherwise provides, the declaration of a
 qualified patient known to the attending physician to be pregnant
 shall be given no force or effect as long as it is probable that
 the fetus could develop to the point of live birth with continued
 application of life-sustaining treatment.
 Section 6. Transfer of Patients
 An attending physician or other health-care provider who is unwilling
 to comply with this [Act] shall as promptly as practicable take all
 reasonable steps to transfer care of the declarant to another physician
 or health-care provider.
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 Section 7. Immunities
 (a) In the absence of knowledge of the revocation of a declaration,
 a person is not subject to civil or criminal liability or discipline
 for unprofessional conduct for carrying out the declaration pursuant
 to the requirements of this [Act].
 (b) A physician or other health-care provider, whose actions under
 this [Act] are in accord with reasonable medical standards, is
 not subject to criminal or civil liability or discipline for un-
 professional conduct.
 Section 8. Penalties
 (a) A physician or other health-care provider who willfully fails
 to transfer in accordance with Section 6 is guilty of [a class
 misdemeanor].
 (b) A physician who willfully fails to record the determination of
 terminal condition in accordance with Section 4 is guilty of [a
 class misdemeanor].
 (c) An individual who willfully conceals, cancels, defaces, or obliterates
 the declaration of another without the declarant's consent or
 who falsifies or forges a revocation of the declaration of another
 is guilty of [a class misdemeanor].
 (d) An individual who falsifies or forges the declaration of another,
 or willfully conceals or withholds personal knowledge of a re-
 vocation as provided in Section 3, is guilty of [a class
 misdemeanor].
 (e) Any person who requires or prohibits the execution of a declaration
 as a condition for being insured for, or receiving, health-care
 services shall be guilty of [a class misdemeanor].
 (f) Any person who coerces or fraudulently induces another to
 execute a declaration under this [Act] shall be guilty of [a class
 misdemeanor].
 (g) The sanctions provided in this section do not displace any
 sanction applicable under other law.
 Section 9. General Provisions
 (a) Death resulting from the withholding or withdrawal of life-
 sustaining treatment pursuant to a declaration and in accordance
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 with this [Act] does not constitute, for any purpose, a suicide
 or homicide.
 (b) The making of a declaration pursuant to Section 2 does not
 affect in any manner the sale, procurement, or issuance of any
 policy of life insurance or annuity, nor does it affect, impair,
 or modify the terms of an existing policy of life insurance or
 annuity. A policy of life insurance or annuity is not legally
 impaired or invalidated in any manner by the withholding or
 withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from an insured qualified
 patient, notwithstanding any term to the contrary.
 (c) A person may not prohibit or require the execution of a declaration
 as a condition for being insured for, or receiving, health-care
 services.
 (d) This [Act] creates no presumption concerning the intention of
 an individual who has revoked or has not executed a declaration
 with respect to the use, withholding, or withdrawal of life-
 sustaining treatment in the event of a terminal condition.
 (e) This [Act] does not affect the right of a patient to make decisions
 regarding use of life-sustaining treatment so long as the patient
 is able to do so, or impair or supersede any right or responsibility
 that any person has to effect the withholding or withdrawal of
 medical care.
 (f) Nothing in this [Act] shall require any physician or other health-
 care provider to take any action contrary to reasonable medical
 standards.
 (g) This [Act] does not condone, authorize, or approve mercy-
 killing or euthanasia.
 Section 10. Presumption of Validity of Declaration
 A physician or other health-care provider may presume, in the
 absence of knowledge to the contrary, that a declaration complies
 with this [Act] and is valid.
 Section 11. Recognition of Declaration Executed in
 Another State
 A declaration executed in another state in compliance with the law
 of that state or this state is validly executed for purposes of this [Act].
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 Section 12. Effect of Prior Declarations
 An instrument executed before the effective date of this [Act] that
 substantially complies with Section 2(a) shall be given effect pursuant
 to the provisions of this [Act].
 Section 13. Severability
 If any provision of this [Act] or its application to any person or
 circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions
 or applications of this [Act] which can be given effect without the
 invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this
 [Act) are severable.
 Section 14. Time of Taking Effect
 This [Act] takes effect on
 Section 15. Uniformity of Construction and Application
 This [Act) shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general
 purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this
 [Act) among states enacting it.
 Section 16. Short Title
 This [Act] may be cited as the Uniform Rights of the Terminally
 Ill Act.
 Section 17. Repeal
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 Appendix 2
 Right to Refuse Treatment Act
 Section 1. Definitions
 "Competent person" shall mean an individual who is able to understand
 and appreciate the nature and consequences of a decision to accept or
 refuse treatment.
 "Declaration" shall mean a written statement executed according
 to the provisions of this Act which sets forth the declarant's intentions
 with respect to medical procedures, treatment or nontreatment, and
 may include the declarant's intentions concerning palliative care.
 "Declarant" shall mean an individual who executes a declaration
 under the provisions of this Act.
 "Health care provider" shall mean a person, facility or institution
 licensed or authorized to provide health care.
 "Incompetent person" shall mean a person who is unable to understand
 and appreciate the nature and consequences of a decision to accept or
 refuse treatment.
 "Medical procedure or treatment" shall mean any action taken by
 a physician or health care provider designed to diagnose, assess, or
 treat a disease, illness, or injury. These include, but are not limited
 to, surgery, drugs, transfusions, mechanical ventilation, dialysis, re-
 suscitation, artificial feeding, and any other medical act designed for
 diagnosis, assessment or treatment.
 "Palliative care" shall mean any measure taken by a physician or
 health care provider designed primarily to maintain the patient's
 comfort. These include, but are not limited to, sedatives and pain-
 killing drugs; non-artificial, oral feeding; suction; hydration; and hygienic
 care.
 "Physician" shall mean any physician responsible for the declarant's
 care.
 Section 2.
 A competent person has the right to refuse any medical procedure
 or treatment, and any palliative care measure.
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 Section 3.
 A competent person may execute a declaration directing the with-
 holding or withdrawal of any medical procedure or treatment or any
 palliative care measure, which is in use or may be used in the future
 in the person's medical care or treatment, even if continuance of the
 medical procedure or treatment could prevent or postpone the person's
 death from being caused by the person's disease, illness or injury.
 The declaration shall be in writing, dated and signed by the declarant
 in the presence of two adult witnesses. The two witnesses must sign
 the declaration, and by their signatures indicate they believe the
 declarant's execution of the declaration was understanding and voluntary.
 Section 4.
 If a person is unable to sign a declaration due to a physical impairment,
 the person may execute a declaration by communicating agreement
 after the declaration has been read to the person in the presence of
 the two adult witnesses. The two witnesses must sign the declaration,
 and by their signatures indicate the person is physically impaired so
 as to be unable to sign the declaration, that the person understands
 the declaration's terms, and that the person voluntarily agrees to the
 terms of the declaration.
 Section 5.
 A declarant shall have the right to appoint in the declaration a
 person authorized to order the administration, withholding, or with-
 drawal of medical procedures and treatment in the event that the
 declarant becomes incompetent. A person so authorized shall have the
 power to enforce the provisions of the declaration and shall be bound
 to exercise this authority consistent with the declaration and the
 authorized person's best judgment as to the actual desires and preferences
 of the declarant. No palliative care measure may be withheld by an
 authorized person unless explicitly provided for in the declaration.
 Physicians and health care providers caring for incompetent declarants
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 shall provide such authorized persons all medical information which
 would be available to the declarant if the declarant were competent.
 Section 6.
 Any declarant may revoke a declaration by destroying or defacing
 it, executing a written revocation, making an oral revocation, or by
 any other act evidencing the declarant's specific intent to revoke the
 declaration.
 Section 7.
 A competent person who orders the withholding or withdrawal of
 treatment shall receive appropriate palliative care unless it is expressly
 stated by the person orally or through a declaration that the person
 refuses palliative care.
 Section 8.
 This act shall not impair or supersede a person's legal right to
 direct the withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment or procedures
 in any other manner recognized by law.
 Section 9.
 No person shall require anyone to execute a declaration as a condition
 of enrollment, continuation, or receipt of benefits for disability, life,
 health or any other type of insurance. The withdrawal or withholding
 of medical procedures or treatment pursuant to the provisions of this
 Act shall not affect the validity of any insurance policy, and shall not
 constitute suicide.
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 Section 10.
 This Act shall create no presumption concerning the intention of
 a person who has failed to execute a declaration. The fact that a person
 has failed to execute a declaration shall not constitute evidence of that
 person's intent concerning treatment or nontreatment.
 Section 11.
 A declaration made pursuant to this Act, an oral refusal by a person,
 or a refusal of medical procedures or treatment through an authorized
 person, shall be binding on all physicians and health care providers
 caring for the declarant.
 Section 12.
 A physician who fails to comply with a written or oral declaration
 and to make necessary arrangements to transfer the declarant to another
 physician who will effectuate the declaration shall be subject to civil
 liability and professional disciplinary action, including license revocation
 or suspension. When acting in good faith to effectuate the terms of
 a declaration or when following the direction of an authorized person
 appointed in a declaration under Section 5, no physician or health
 care provider shall be liable in any civil, criminal, or administrative
 action for withholding or withdrawing any medical procedure, treatment,
 or palliative care measure. When acting in good faith, no witness to
 a declaration, or person authorized to make treatment decisions under
 Section 5, shall be liable in any civil, criminal, or administrative
 action.
 Section 13.
 A person found guilty of willfully concealing a declaration, or
 falsifying or forging a revocation of a declaration, shall be subject to
 criminal prosecution for a misdemeanor fthe class or type of misdemeanor
 is left to the determination of individual state legislatures].
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 Section 14.
 Any person who falsifies or forges a declaration, or who willfully
 conceals or withholds information concerning the revocation of a dec-
 laration, with the intent to cause a withholding or withdrawal of life-
 sustaining procedures from a person, and who thereby causes life-
 sustaining procedures to be withheld or withdrawn and death to be
 hastened, shall be subject to criminal prosecution for a felony [the
 class or type of felony is left to the determination of individual state
 legislatures].
 Section 15.
 If any provision or application of this Act is held invalid, this
 invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the Act
 which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application,
 and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable.
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